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How this man was not loved 25 years ago in Moscow squares! After all, it was he who publicly said, back in 1988, the famous phrase “Boris, you’re wrong!” And Boris then became a popular hero and idol, collected 89% (!) of the votes of Muscovites in the 1989 elections and, of course, everyone literally hated the author of the catchphrases. The phrase soon migrated to cartoons, popular badges of the Yeltsinists (“Boris, you’re right!”) and their posters (“Fight! You’re right!”).

Caricature from the perestroika magazine "Ogonyok" and a badge based on the catchphrase of Yegor Kuzmich Ligachev



Personification of bribery and corruption-1989 - Egor Kuzmich Ligachev

I already wrote once about the rallies of thousands of “democrats” in Luzhniki in the spring of 1989, then such events were new, and I attended a couple of the first such rallies. I remember the next episode. One of the “democratic” Zlatoustists (I think Yuri Chernichenko) passionately declared from the podium:
- Why is a person who failed ideology transferred to agriculture?! We don’t want to swallow Ligachev’s frog!..
Publicly criticizing a member of the Politburo sounded bold and sharp at that time, and the crowd of one hundred thousand, as one person, exploded with angry cries:
- Down with Ligachev!..
At that moment I looked at Yeltsin, who was standing on the podium: a satisfied smile played on his lips.
And then the tireless investigators Gdlyan and Ivanov (also popular heroes of those days) introduced the idea to the masses that Yegor Kuzmich allegedly took bribes. Of course, the Yeltsinists took this revelation with a bang. And now just think: to what degree of inadequacy can human perception be distorted, if people perceived Yegor Kuzmich as a symbol of corruption and bribery, and Boris Nikolayevich as the embodiment of honesty and integrity!.. If you think about it a little, it’s just scary...: (


The embodiment of integrity - 1989 - Boris Nikolaevich Yeltsin

“A fighter against privileges” Yeltsin came to the Kremlin, relatively speaking, by bus (he had such a habit in 1989 - to ride on public transport, which the people perceived with a bang). But how and with what did he leave there?..
And this, for comparison, is from Natalya Morozova’s essay about Ligachev: “I met Yegor Kuzmich in the Duma. It used to be, already in the evening, all the deputies had left, and Yegor Kuzmich was sitting in his office and working, working, working. I remember how once , in the same hot summer as today, I get out of the metro and go to a party event. I see Ligachev also leaving the metro and heading there. I ask: Egor Kuzmich, why not by car? It would be better to sit in the dacha in such hot weather. So do you know what he answered me? “Eh, Natalya Pavlovna, I’m ashamed to admit, but I don’t have a car or a dacha.”
...So why, one might ask, did 89% of voters then follow Yeltsin and not Ligachev?..
Probably, descendants will never understand this. :(

The reproach against Boris Yeltsin turned out to be a prophecy that no one heard.
Member of the Politburo of the CPSU Central Committee Yegor Ligachev. 1990


Back in '83...

The era of perestroika in the Soviet Union left in the people's memory much more bitter than rosy memories. The time of great hopes ended with the collapse of the country, which left a negative imprint on the perception of this historical period.
But the phrase “Boris, you’re wrong!”, which has become a catchphrase, is remembered with a smile even by those who, due to their age, remember little about that era. However, the question of what Boris was actually wrong about, who caught him wrong and how the phrase became part of folklore hangs in the air.
Perhaps it’s worth starting from afar, from 1983, when new leader USSR Yuri Andropov, updating management personnel, brought to work in Moscow the 63-year-old first secretary of the Tomsk regional committee of the CPSU, Yegor Ligachev.
For the realities of the first half of the 1980s, 63-year-old Ligachev, who, moreover, did not suffer from serious illnesses and had proven himself well in his previous position, was quite a young and promising politician. In Moscow, Ligachev took the post of head of the department of the CPSU Central Committee, and later became secretary of the CPSU Central Committee.
Lev Zaikov, Egor Ligachev and Mikhail Gorbachev. 1988

Protégé of Comrade Ligachev

Ligachev enjoyed the trust of Andropov, who entrusted him with further activities for the selection of new personnel. In particular, Andropov advised taking a closer look at the 52-year-old First Secretary of the Sverdlovsk Regional Committee of the CPSU, Boris Yeltsin.
Ligachev went to Sverdlovsk and was extremely pleased with what he saw, believing that Yeltsin was exactly the person the country needed in an era of change.
True, Yeltsin’s nomination to work in Moscow took place only two years later - after Andropov’s death, the reform process that had begun stalled and resumed only in 1985, when Mikhail Gorbachev took over as leader of the USSR.
Thus, on the recommendation of Yegor Ligachev, Sverdlovsk resident Boris Yeltsin found himself in big Soviet politics.
In December 1985, Yeltsin was given the highest confidence - he was nominated for the post of first secretary of the Moscow City Party Committee, which made the politician one of the most influential people in the country.
Soon, rumors spread throughout Moscow about the unusual democratic nature of the new leader of the capital: he allegedly personally got acquainted with the assortment of grocery stores, received treatment in a regular clinic, and even went to work by tram.

Party disgrace and people's love

Yeltsin's popularity began to grow by leaps and bounds, even exceeding the popularity of Mikhail Gorbachev. Either this turned the politician’s head, or personal ambitions awoke, but soon Yeltsin began to violently conflict with his party comrades.
On October 21, 1987, at the Plenum of the CPSU Central Committee, Yeltsin sharply spoke out against the slow pace of perestroika, criticized his colleagues, including Ligachev, and even got to Gorbachev, declaring that a “cult of personality” was beginning to form around the Secretary General.

The tone of Yeltsin’s speech did not even fit into the framework of the “perestroika” announced in the country. Party comrades, including those who sympathized with Yeltsin, declared his demarche “politically erroneous,” after which he fell into disgrace and was removed from his post as first secretary of the Moscow city party committee.
In the traditions of the CPSU, it was not customary to wash dirty linen in public, therefore the text of Yeltsin’s speech was not published anywhere. But dozens of versions of this speech appeared in samizdat, which had nothing to do with reality. In some of them, Yeltsin almost cursed at Gorbachev and looked more like a longshoreman than a politician.
It was with this legendary speech that Yeltsin’s fame as an oppositionist began. It was then that Soviet citizens, who began to become disillusioned with Gorbachev, began to perceive Yeltsin as an alternative to Mikhail Sergeevich. Mikhail Gorbachev and Boris Yeltsin during the evening meeting of the extraordinary session of the RSFSR Supreme Council

Prophet in the ranks of the CPSU

The times of perestroika in terms of internal party struggle were not as tough as previous eras, therefore the disgraced Yeltsin, having lost the post of “master of Moscow,” remained in the elite as the first deputy chairman of the USSR State Construction Committee.
Yeltsin, who was having a hard time being removed from office, nevertheless, by the summer of 1988, realized that his current position as a “rebel” had many advantages, and began to develop the role of an “oppositionist.”
On July 1, 1988, Yeltsin spoke at the 19th Party Conference. He attacked the privileges of senior government leaders, criticized the “stagnation” for which, in his opinion, the entire Politburo as a “collective body” was to blame, called for Ligachev to be removed from the Politburo, and ultimately appealed to the delegates to rehabilitate him for his speech at the Plenum.
In the midst of Yeltsin’s speech, Ligachev intervened. The politician who once nominated the Sverdlovsk resident remarked:
- You, Boris, are wrong. We disagree with you not only on tactics. Boris, you have enormous energy, but this energy is not creative, but destructive! You put your region on coupons...
Yeltsin ignored the remark and continued his speech.


The phrase most likely would not have become a catchphrase if humorist Gennady Khazanov had not soon used it in one of his monologues “on the topic of the day.” In the thoroughly politicized USSR of the late 1980s, a joke related to the battle between the “people's hero” Yeltsin and the party nomenklatura immediately became extremely popular.
From that moment on, it was adopted by Yeltsin’s supporters, who took to the streets with posters “Boris, you’re right!” and even “Rule, Boris!”
The last wish soon came true. And the longer Boris ruled, the more prophetic Ligachev’s words seemed: “Boris, you have enormous energy, but this energy is not creative, but destructive!”...
But there was no sense in this prophecy anymore. Yeltsin's destructive energy did its job.
And the only good thing left for people to remember from that era was a catchphrase...

http://back-in-ussr.com/2016/07/boris-ty-ne-prav-istoriya-kr...

Egor Ligachev: “For some reason, no one ever remembers that the phrase “Boris, you’re wrong” had a continuation.”
Photo by Rosa Tsvetkova

Yegor Kuzmich Ligachev is one of the most controversial figures of perestroika. At first one of the main associates of Mikhail Gorbachev, then one of his main opponents in the Politburo. After the publication, allegedly with the sanction of Ligachev, in “Soviet Russia” of Nina Andreeva’s letter “I cannot give up principles”, he was declared almost the main enemy of perestroika. Yegor Ligachev told the executive editor of NG-Politics, Rosa Tsvetkova, about the events of those years, the discord with Gorbachev and the fight against alcoholism.

– Yegor Kuzmich, today, a quarter of a century later, how do you evaluate such a concept as “perestroika”?

– First of all, what does perestroika mean? There are two views on it, two positions. And exactly the opposite. The first position, which I strictly adhere to and for which I worked in the Politburo and as part of the Central Committee of the Party, is this. We conceived a socialist restructuring, that is, a socialist renewal of society without dismantling the Soviet system. After all, our country came to the 80s with powerful economic and sociocultural potential. And with enormous influence on the course of world development.

– But wasn’t perestroika preceded by the so-called Brezhnev era of stagnation?

“That’s what our enemies and opponents thought.” But this is sheer nonsense. For 18 years, Leonid Ilyich Brezhnev was the General Secretary of the Central Committee. During these years, the country's industrial potential tripled. Agriculture increased by 50%, increased by almost 50% wages on average in people. Over these 18 years, five largest nuclear power plants and two automotive giants - KamAZ and VAZ - were built.

At this time, not only thousands of individual enterprises were built, but entire production and territorial complexes were created. For example, I was the most active participant in the creation of the West Siberian gas chemical complex.

In the first year of Leonid Ilyich’s work, we produced 1 million tons of oil in Siberia; in the year of his death, in 1982, the country received 325 million tons of oil. In addition, the largest world-scale petrochemical plants were created in this West Siberian gas and chemical complex, dozens of cities were built, thousands of kilometers of roads and power lines were laid. What kind of era of stagnation is this? God grant that now there is at least a thousandth part of this era.

– But the Soviet economy also had many problems?

– Yes, by that time difficulties had already accumulated that needed to be dealt with. For example, the gap between the growth of labor productivity and the efficiency of production of civilian products has been increasing all the time compared to developed countries West. We were falling further and further behind. There has been a serious lag in the development of socialist democracy - this is also very important. The gap between the effective demand of the population and its need for high-quality consumer goods grew - the shortage of goods increased incredibly. Problems accumulated between the Union Center and the republics. All this required changes. Similar perestroikas have already happened before in the USSR - the transition from war communism to NEP, from NEP to industrialization and many more reforms. So there was nothing surprising in the process itself.

– This, as I understand it, is your opinion about what perestroika is. What about the second point of view?

– Another position is the position of Gorbachev, Yeltsin and his associates. To justify their betrayal of socialism and betrayal of the party and people, they came up with the following explanation. They say that the Soviet system did a lot (everyone knew that it went down in history with glorious pages), but it cannot be reformed, improved, or perfected. We need to break it down and replace it with capitalism. Here's their point of view.

They say that there was perestroika, but it had no goal, no program, no means, and that’s why the results are like this. This is wrong, it wasn’t like that at all. The goal was clearly and clearly formulated - the creation of a new modern highly efficient economy, further improvement of the material life of the people and expansion of the real participation of workers in the management of the Soviet state. The economic basis of the perestroika program was the following - the rapid growth of the machine-building complex, its modernization and, on the basis of the modernized machine-building complex, the expansion of the entire national economy and the reorientation of the economy to solve people's problems on the basis of rapidly developing science and technology. How was this secured financially? In the 12th Five-Year Plan - 1986-1990 - the years of perestroika - it was planned to allocate 200 billion rubles for the modernization of the mechanical engineering complex, for the rapid growth of mechanical engineering and especially machine tool industry. This is twice as much as in previous decades. In addition, it was allocated for the creation of a modern light food industry, high-quality consumer goods 70 billion rubles, which is significantly more than in the previous 40 post-war years. By the way, I was involved in the modernization of the food and light industries and mechanical engineering. So, in America at that time there was 48% of computerized equipment in the total volume of the food industry, in our country it was 1%.

– That is, we were seriously lagging behind developed countries...

“We were terribly behind.” But perestroika had a goal, a program and all the necessary material resources.

From my point of view, perestroika took place in two stages. The first stage – 1985–1988 – was the active phase of perestroika within the framework of socialism, when the Soviet system was not dismantled, but only reformed and improved. We managed to stop negative trends in the development of society, the economy, and the development of the country as a whole. And ensure a new boom in the economy, in improving people’s lives. During this five-year period, industrial production increased by 5% compared to 3% of the previous, 11th five-year plan (1981–1985). Agriculture increased by 3% compared to 1% in the previous year. At this time we received the highest harvest ever Russian history. But the main thing is achievements in the social sphere. At this time, the most large number housing – 625 million square meters. Compared to the previous five-year plan, housing construction increased by 20%. As for the construction of schools, kindergartens, hospitals, clubs, and sports facilities, their number increased from 15 to 51%.

The second stage was 1989–1990, when the processes of disintegration began. This is a period of disorganization of the economy, the consumer market, rising prices, aggravation of the previously existing shortage of goods, strikes, and national conflicts. And it all ends with the defeat of the Communist Party.

– What are the reasons for the defeat of the ideology of perestroika, the goals of which, as you say, were very noble?

– The first reason is the political degeneration of a group of country leaders and leaders union republics. Why, if they were already leaders and had everything? All for the sake of personal enrichment through the robbery of large national property and its appropriation. Neither the Soviet government nor Communist Party. The leaders of the republics did not have any foreign bank accounts or large real estate, as, for example, people in power and oligarchs now have. The desire to have large property and undivided control drove these people.

The second reason is that, unfortunately, we have stopped, neglecting the history of our people, party and state, from fighting bourgeois national separatism. Gorbachev also admitted this at the end of his tenure as General Secretary. National-separatist sentiments developed in the republics, especially in the late 1980s.

The third reason is the sharp weakening of the country's planned leadership. Relatively recently, Vladimir Putin said that they destroyed the Soviet government because they planned. This is absolutely wrong. Soviet power was ruined because the state abandoned planning. There are two factors here. Firstly, in 1988, free negotiated prices began to be introduced. What does this mean? It is not the planning authority that sets prices, but the producer and consumer. Maybe contract prices should have been introduced, but gradually... Meanwhile, Gorbachev, Yakovlev and others insisted that the right to sell 30% of production in this way should be immediately given.

What did this lead to? We had enterprises that produced almost a monopoly of one or another product - one or two factories produced it for the whole country. When there is planning, it is not dangerous because the state sets prices. And when producers set the price themselves, they can rip off three skins from the consumer. This is how manufacturers have huge incomes. It would be possible to use them for technical re-equipment. But nothing of the kind was done; the proceeds went to be shared among a limited number of people.

Plus, the so-called industrial cooperatives also had an influence. At the proposal of the Council of Ministers, decisions of the Central Committee were adopted on the creation of industrial cooperatives. They were often created not on the basis of an association of small commodity producers, but on the basis of leasing or purchasing state property. And then these products were sold not to the population, but to the enterprise at a very high price. When cooperatives began to operate, both became refuges of the shadow economy, shadow capital. A refuge for the Gusinskys, Berezovskys and others. This is where the oligarchs were born. In fact, this was the denationalization of state property, transfer into private hands, because the cooperative was a shell, behind which were hidden three or four owners who took the main prize, and the rest were hired workers.

The growth of the deficit greatly undermined the economy. We increased wages over the five-year period by 65%, and the production of goods by 19%. Even Gorbachev recently said what needed to be done: purchase goods abroad. There was money and opportunities. But they did not agree to this; Nikolai Ryzhkov did not agree as head of government. This led to empty stores and queues.

Another reason is political careerism, the formation of factions, groups and platforms within the party, the loosening of the ideological and constitutional foundations of the party, which ultimately led to the destruction of the country. The secretariat, which is a statutory body, stopped working, and forces began to concentrate in it that were ready to resist the destruction of the state. By this time, the entire composition of the Politburo had already been renewed. For example, within a year and a half I was actually removed from the Politburo, Supreme Council, composition of the Central Committee. Gorbachev then insisted: do not interfere in the elections, in the economy. That is, the party was removed from big politics and economics. All this in December 1991 led to a counter-revolutionary coup d'etat, the collapse of the Soviet Union - this was the end of perestroika.

– Why did they launch a loud anti-alcohol campaign in these difficult conditions?

– The fight against alcoholism was based on two factors. First, by 1985, the production and consumption of alcohol had increased significantly over the previous 20 years. Per capita alcohol consumption in pure alcohol at this time was approximately 8–10 liters. At that time, in other countries it was 3–4 times less. The second factor is that the demand among our people, work collectives and the public to put a barrier to drunkenness and alcoholism has been growing all the time. Here is an interesting phenomenon: when Yuri Vladimirovich Andropov was elected general secretary in 1982, he received tens of thousands of letters and telegrams. Almost every letter mentioned one demand - to curb drunkenness and alcoholism. This was not just one letter, I read them, it was a real groan of wives, children and a plea to save their husbands and sons from drunkenness and alcoholism. These two circumstances prompted us to start an alcohol campaign.

They say we didn’t have any special goals, just to overcome. Nothing of the kind. Our goal was clearly and clearly formulated - saving the people. Many believe that this is Solzhenitsyn’s term – “saving the people.” This expression belongs to Mikhail Lomonosov. We took it and began to use it to strengthen our moral principles, to strengthen our family and health.

– In what ways did you try to conduct this campaign?

– First, we tried to improve people’s living conditions: housing, social and cultural institutions, wages. Second, yes, we made a sharp reduction in vodka production by 40%, increased champagne by 60%, left cognac - the Armenians persuaded us to leave it - and put an end to the chatterbox. The chatter was completely eliminated. Third is the promotion and organization of a healthy life for workers. And one more thing, which is very important: the responsibility of the heads of regions, territories, republics, small and large work collectives for overcoming drunkenness at work and at home has been greatly increased. And I want to say frankly that those who could not cope with this evil were removed from work, expelled from the party, even from high positions.

– What were the results anti-alcohol struggle?

– Now they say that there were no results. Nothing of the kind. Our anti-alcohol campaign, for all its mistakes, saved from half a million to a million people. The production and consumption of wine and vodka products sharply decreased from 10 to 6 liters per capita. Statistics say that during these years the population increased annually by 500,000 people, that is, the birth rate exceeded the death rate. This is one of the main achievements. In addition, it should be said that for the first time in many families they began to see sober husbands, as they wrote to us, and drunk people began to be afraid to appear on the street. At this time, occupational injuries, crime, and absenteeism decreased by 25–30%, deposits in savings books increased by 45 billion rubles, and sales of soft drinks increased by 60%.

It is very important that during this campaign, all leaders were weaned from drinking at the expense of public funds. Many people liked to drink for free, they gathered, drank, discussed important personnel issues, and then presented the bill to the state. This was decisively eradicated, although we made many enemies.

– But the ongoing campaign also revealed serious shortcomings?

– One of the negative features was the revival of moonshine production. We are accused of two things: allegedly cutting down vineyards and organizing queues. The queues were due to the fact that we sharply reduced the production of alcoholic beverages. I want to ask my comrades who accuse us of creating queues: is alcohol a food product, you can’t live without it? Is the life of one saved person worth less than standing in line? Moreover, it is generally accepted: alcohol is poison.

And regarding the cutting down of vineyards: in the Soviet Union before the anti-alcohol campaign there were 1 million 260 thousand hectares, after the active phase of the anti-alcohol policy - 1 million 230 thousand hectares. The numbers speak for themselves. I remember once at a meeting of the Supreme Council, Mr. Sobchak - he was such an anti-Soviet who was always engaged in anti-Soviet attacks and did nothing good for the people - said, addressing the Krasnodar residents: you are cutting down vineyards. After his speech, the Krasnodar residents took the floor and said: Sobchak, we ask you to come with us tomorrow at our expense and show where we are cutting down vineyards. After this, Sobchak was not heard from.

Today there is no serious fight against drunkenness at all, just a talking shop. Why? It’s simple: excessive drinking of alcohol, and there are many drinkers – if under the Soviet regime there were hundreds of drunks, now there are millions of them – distracts people from protest actions. Drunk people are easier to control. In addition, the production of alcohol is a huge income, it is a nest of corruption and bribery, a nest of feeding politicians who serve the wine and vodka barons and the current government.

I am proud that I, along with other comrades, took an active part in anti-alcohol policy and its implementation. Many say the campaign had opponents in its leadership. But there were no opponents. May 15, by the way, marked 25 years since the day three most important anti-alcohol documents were unanimously adopted: the decision of the Central Committee, the resolution of the Central Committee and the Council of Ministers, and the decree of the Supreme Council.

– But Nikolai Ryzhkov said, including to our newspaper, that he was against the anti-alcohol campaign...

- He was in favor. There is evidence. Here are the words from the report that Ryzhkov delivered as Chairman of the Council of Ministers at the 27th Party Congress in 1986: “The Party is waging an uncompromising fight against drunkenness and alcoholism, the line of reducing the production and consumption of alcoholic beverages will continue to be steadily maintained.” Which Nikolai Ivanovich should we believe: the first or the second? We were all united, and the shortcomings began to be seriously corrected, paying more attention to the organization of free non-working time, explanatory work, and beliefs.

– Why was the campaign stopped?

Main reason The fact is that the processes of destruction of the country have already begun. It was already necessary to save the Motherland, the country from many troubles that the dismemberment of the Soviet Union brought. The Council of Ministers immediately drew up, as they called it, a “drunk budget” in 1989, returned to the previous figures, and everything went as before. If these processes did not exist, we would, of course, continue to work to combat alcoholism and drunkenness. Sobriety should be the norm. During perestroika, by the way, about whether Ligachev drinks or doesn’t drink, there were all kinds of fables... If we had two bottles of wine standing now, I would drink with you, well, not a glass, but half a glass. The day before yesterday they celebrated their 80th birthday at Lukyanov’s, there were about 12–15 of us there, I drank as much as I was supposed to. But I am never drawn to vodka, cognac, or champagne.

– Did you try to resist the destruction of the Soviet Union?

“We offered resistance, but it was unorganized and fragmented. The Russian Communist Party and the Peasant (Agrarian) Union were created. I, the only member of the Politburo, took part in the creation of these organizations and spoke at their congresses. But these were already belated measures. I sent two letters to the Politburo two years before the collapse of the Soviet Union, where I demanded an emergency convocation of a congress, a plenum, and with an invitation to the plenum of party activists, so that it would be widespread. Unfortunately, no people were found, and the Politburo stopped it all. But that wasn't the main thing. Here is the Belovezhskaya conspiracy. Keep in mind that for the common man the words of the leaders meant great value. What did they announce? We are reorganizing, carrying out reform... But there will be a single economic space, common armed forces, currency, free movement. And ordinary people said: everything will be fine, only there will be no Gorbachev, etc. This was a deception of the people.

– Your famous phrase “Boris, you’re wrong” will remain in history. Are you still sure that Yeltsin acted wrongly?

– Everyone only remembers the beginning of my sentence. And I completely said this: “Boris, you are wrong, you have energy, but your energy is not creative, but destructive.” If I were wrong, the country would prosper, and Soviet Union remained strong and powerful. Unfortunately, life has confirmed that I am right. I really got to know Yeltsin when he became secretary of the Moscow City Party Committee. I saw how he strangled the cadres, people, dealt with them, and began to drink thoroughly. This is where we had a collision. I was the only one who spoke out against Yeltsin at the 19th Party Conference, because I already realized that he was a very dangerous figure. After the conference, we went in completely different directions. In the end, I believe that the position I took turned out to be fair, correct and decent.

– How was your relationship with Gorbachev?

– At first, we had excellent relations with Gorbachev. He was the initiator of my joining the Central Committee. We started working in a friendly and active manner. Our first disagreements began with the assessment of Prokhorov, with the assessment of the Brezhnev period. I could not agree that this is an era of stagnation. The raising of virgin soil is a colossal work, as is the creation of the Siberian Branch of the Academy of Sciences and the West Siberian Oil and Gas Complex. How could I agree that this is stagnation? And Gorbachev wanted to establish himself and show off our great achievements. The question of personality is, of course, also important. Perestroika was necessary, possible and feasible - this is my firm opinion. If there had been Andropov - firm, clear, definite, modest - the country would have lived and worked. For example, parallels are drawn between Gorbachev and Medvedev. Both of them supposedly build capitalism. And when Medvedev says “Russia, go ahead!” - this means forward to capitalism. But this is the path not forward, but backward. Lenin has brilliant words: you cannot move forward without moving towards socialism. And Gorbachev and Medvedev are leading Russia to the point that society has already passed in the West.

In 1957, the then secretary of the Novosibirsk regional party committee, Yegor Kuzmich Ligachev, visited China. Met with Mao Zedong, his future successor Liu Shaoqi, as well as Zhou Enlai. A year later, the “Great Leap Forward” began in China - a political and economic program of sharp rise and modernization, and then the “Cultural Revolution”.

Many years have passed, and Yegor Kuzmich is still reluctant to remember that trip and resolutely does not admit what he talked about with the Chinese leaders, as if hinting: “Yes, yes, anything can happen.” Publicly, Yegor Kuzmich stated: “I was performing a special task. It’s too early to say which one.”
Let's wait some more, then.

Vive La Siberia!

After the dismissal of Khrushchev, Ligachev, who held the position of deputy in the CPSU Central Committee. head of the department of propaganda and agitation for the RSFSR, wrote a letter to the new Secretary General Leonid Brezhnev. In the letter, Ligachev outlined a request to send him to work in... Siberia. Both in those years and now, the nomenklatura is trying to move from the provinces to the capitals, but why not back!

It took a month to formulate the answer. As a result, Brezhnev allowed Ligachev to work as the first secretary of the Tomsk regional committee of the CPSU. When, years later, the Politburo decided to send Yegor Kuzmich as ambassador to a capitalist country, he again turned to the Secretary General with the same request: “Leave him in Siberia.”
Under Ligachev, who ruled the Tomsk region for more than 17 years, the West Siberian oil and gas complex was built - one of the backbones of the current Russian economic model.

Cooperative "Pechora"

The loud fight against corrupt members of cooperatives was not invented in our days. In a sense, Yegor Kuzmich was at the origins of such campaigns at the dawn of the revival of Russian capitalism.

The fact is that at the beginning of Perestroika there were two groups in the CPSU Central Committee: liberal and orthodox. The former advocated for new business models, the latter for strengthening and improving old party methods of management. Meanwhile, the cooperative movement was growing in the country.
In 1987, the head of the Pechora mining artel, Vadim Tumanov (the hero of Vladimir Vysotsky’s songs), was unexpectedly accused of some kind of murder scam. Searches and interrogations begin. "Pechora" was one of the flagships of the domestic cooperative movement. Behind the organization of the show trial against Tumanov was, among other people, Yegor Ligachev. The charges against Tumanov were eventually dropped, but Pechora was still dissolved “for violating clause 9 of the standard charter of the miners’ artel.”

"Prohibition"

“If vodka is eight, / We still won’t stop drinking. / Together we will say to Ilyich: / “We can handle ten.” / Well, if it’s twenty-five, / We’ll take Winter again,” - in a country where people compose such couplets, any politician trying to lobby for a tough anti-alcohol campaign is doomed to unpopularity. Yegor Ligachev was the main ideologist and organizer of the fight against drunkenness, but he did not remain the final villain in people’s memory, although this was the sixth and most severe anti-alcohol campaign in the history of Russia in the 20th century.
As a result of the “Prohibition Law”, the USSR budget annually lost 10-12% of tax revenues, the Soviet people learned the taste of “Cucumber” lotion and “Triple” cologne, Gorbachev got the nickname “Mineral Secretary”, and Yegor Kuzmich himself immortalized the rubber glove - it was worn onto a three-liter jar in which the yeast was fermenting, and gradually rose: “Greetings to Ligachev!”

Disputes about how many vineyards were cut down, new children were born, died from poisoning, and were saved from inevitable cirrhosis of the liver during the violent but short-lived campaign last for many years. Public consensus has not yet been reached.
Ligachev's initiative became the last grandiose all-Union ideological, political and economic campaign. At the peak of socialist construction they fought for virgin lands, at the end - for sobriety. It is not for nothing that folklore has a special memory of all these alcohol-free weddings, sobriety societies and an incredible number of jokes: “A bribe-giver comes to an official, thrusts an envelope with money, and he yells: “Unlock the door immediately, otherwise they will think that we are drinking here!” .

Boris, you're wrong!

An amazing thing, but the main fighter for popular sobriety pushed to the top of Russian power, probably the hardest-drinking Russian “tsar” since the time of Peter I.
It was on Ligachev’s recommendation that the future first president of Russia got a job in the apparatus of the CPSU Central Committee in April 1985: “A large-scale person. Our man,” said Yegor Kuzmich about Yeltsin. It is impossible to explain how a militant teetotaler, under whom first in Tomsk and then throughout the country fiercely fought against alcohol abuse, took a liking to Yeltsin.
However, just three years later, in 1988, speaking at the 19th party conference, Ligachev said to his protégé from the podium: “Boris, you’re wrong!” - Having acquired wings, the phrase will fly away among the people forever.

Oldest MP

In the late 90s, having retired, Ligachev returned to big politics. December 19, 1999 Egor Kuzmich was elected Deputy State Duma third convocation from the Tomsk region. According to tradition, as the oldest deputy, a month after the elections he opens the first Duma meeting in the 21st century. Even if you want to, it’s hard not to see some important symbol in this.



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