V. Klyuchevsky
By decree of March 5, 1711, the Senate was ordered to elect a chief fiscal, an intelligent and kind man, no matter what his rank, who should secretly oversee all matters and inquire about unjust trials, “as well as in collecting the treasury and so on.” The Chief Fiscal brought the accused, “no matter how high,” to justice before the Senate and convicted him there. Having proven his accusation, the fiscal received half the fine from the person convicted; but even an unproven accusation was forbidden to blame the fiscal, even to annoy him for this “under severe punishment and ruin of his entire estate.” The Chief Fiscal acted through a network of subordinate fiscals spread across all regions and departments. Since, according to the decree, each city must be equipped with one or two fiscals, and cities were then counted up to 340, then all such detectives, metropolitan, provincial and city and departmental, could be at least 500. Subsequently, this network became even more complex: in The fleet had its own chief fiscal with special subordinate fiscals. The irresponsibility of fiscal officials led to arbitrariness and abuse, which were not slow to come to light. Chief Fiscal Nesterov himself, a zealous denouncer of all untruths, who did not spare even his direct superiors, senators, supreme guardians of justice, not excluding Prince Ya.F. Dolgoruky, whose official correctness was a proverb, who brought the Siberian governor Prince Gagarin to the gallows with his denunciations - this same warrior of truth was caught in bribes, convicted and sentenced to death by being thrown on the wheel. Old Russian legal proceedings allowed reporting as a private means of initiating a court case, but the means were double-edged: by bringing the accused under torture, the reporting party could himself be subjected to it. Now the denunciation has become government agency , free from any risk. The establishment of the position of fiscal introduced a morally unsound motive into management and into society. The Great Russian bishops, indifferent and even incapable of moral education of their flock, remained silent as usual; but the Little Russian Metropolitan Stefan Yavorsky, guardian of the patriarchal throne, could not bear it and in 1713, on Tsar’s Day, in the presence of senators, in a sermon he directly called the decree on fiscal taxes a vicious law, adding to this transparent and reproachful allusions to the way of life of Peter himself. The senators forbade Stephen to preach; but Peter did not touch his high-ranking accuser and even, perhaps, remembered his sermon in 1714, giving the fiscal a more cautious and responsible formulation in the new decree and, among other things, assigning to him the prosecutorial duty of searching for “people's cases for which there is no petitioner " However, subsequently another Little Russian, Feofan Prokopovich, covered up the liberal sin of his fellow countryman by inserting into his Spiritual Regulations a bashful instruction that church unrest and superstitious customs should be reported to the bishop by those who commissioned them or by deans specially designated for this purpose, “like spiritual fiscals.” But soon the newly established Synod, abandoning false modesty and referring to the same Spiritual Regulations, introduced into its department not “as if”, but real spiritual fiscals, on the model of secular ones, only gave them something else, taken from Catholic terminology and more intelligible to spiritual ears the title of inquisitors, and ordered the recruitment of “purely conscientious” people for this position, of course from the monastic rank. Hieromonk Paphnutius, builder of the Moscow Danilov Monastery, was appointed proto-inquisitor. Without limiting denunciation to the circle of official relations, Peter's legislation tried to bring it to a wider field of action. Fiscalism was by law an auxiliary instrument of the Senate; but the senators treated the fiscals with contempt and rudeness, because they reported to the king and the Senate; Prince Ya. Dolgoruky in the Senate called them antichrists and rogues. Recognizing the rank of fiscal as difficult and hated and accepting it under his special protection, Peter wanted to create support for it in public morals. A series of publicly announced decrees, taking up arms against robbery and any crafty encroachment on state interests, called on all ranks of people “from the first even to the farmers” to come without fear and report to the tsar himself about the robbers of the people and the saboteurs of state interests; the time for such reports is from October to March; a truthful informer “for such service” will receive movable and immovable property, even the rank of criminal. According to the letter of the law, the peasant of Prince Dolgoruky, who truthfully denounced him, received his estate and the rank of general-kriegsplenipotentiary; and whoever, the decree added, knowing the violators of the decrees, does not notify, he himself “will be executed or punished without mercy.” Denunciation became not only for the fiscal, but also for the common man in the street, a “service”, a kind of duty in kind; Philistine consciences were selected for the treasury, like horses for the army. Encouraged by fines, investigation and denunciation turned into a craft, into earnings and, together with the fine, threatened to become the most active protection of law and order, even decency.
Fiscalat
As mentioned above, simultaneously with the organization of the Senate in 1711, the positions of fiscals were created. Subsequently, a whole system of fiscal law was organized by a series of decrees, completed in 1717. The Fiscalat was originally supposed to be a secret surveillance body.
The decree of March 5, 1711 proposed to the Senate “ select chief fiscal officer , a kind and intelligent person (from whatever rank he is).” This also contained a definition of his duties: “he must secretly supervise all matters and inspect about unjust trials, as well as in collecting the treasury and other things, and whoever commits untruth, the fiscal must call him before the Senate (no matter how high the level is) and convict him there.” " If the incrimination was successful, half of the fine from the accused went to the fiscal; non-incrimination should not “incriminate the fiscal, nor cause annoyance, under cruel punishment and ruin of the estate.”
Under the jurisdiction of the chief fiscal there should have been provincial fiscals, and under them “several lower ones”, which “in everything have the same strength and freedom as the chief fiscal, except for one thing, that the highest judge or general staff for the court without chief “They can’t call the fiscal.”
At the beginning of 1712, it was indicated that the fiscals would be placed under the department of the Senate, and their independence in relation to the governors was asserted.
Peter threatened the senators with execution if they did not consider “fiscal denunciations.”
Not content with this, Peter handed over these denunciations for consideration and for investigations about them to be carried out by trusted persons, namely, to the so-called “major’s offices”, later in secret office
Decree of 1715 on " fiscal positions established more precisely the terms of reference and composition of the fiscal office. At the chief fiscal, as well as at the provincial (provincial) and city fiscals, four positions of assistants were established, two of which were from the merchant class, “so that they could secretly know the merchant class.” The functions of fiscals were defined as follows. “Their action is this - the collection of all silent cases, that is: 1) all crimes of decrees; 2) all sorts of bribes and theft of the treasury and so on that may be detrimental to state interests, whatever the name may be; 3) also other people’s affairs, for which there are no petitioners, for example, if a visitor is killed or the last heir of his family dies in infancy without the testament of the spiritual ancestors of his ancestors, and other similar silent matters, which do not have a petitioner for themselves.”
This decree significantly limited the impunity of fiscal reports. The amount of the fine going to the fiscal is reduced to a quarter. Now the fiscals had to inquire about all matters not only secretly, but also openly.
With the establishment of the collegiums, all fiscal matters were transferred from the Senate to the justice collegium, which included the chief fiscal officer. According to the General Regulations, fiscals were also established under each board.
The General Regulations established that in the event “if he (fiscals) for the president (of the college), or “then his non-existence. governs, if he sees the opposite, he must report this to the fiscal general.”
However, at this time and until 1723, there was no fiscal general under the Senate. Since 1723, the fiscal general was attached to the Senate and was listed in a higher service rank than the chief fiscal officer who had previously been attached to the Senate.
When the prosecutor's office was created, the fiscal authorities were subordinated to the supervision of the prosecutor general. However, after the appointment of the fiscal general, a decree followed that all fiscal reports should be sent to this latter. Until the end of Peter's reign, both institutions existed in parallel, and in a number of cases the activities of the prosecutor's office were based on fiscal materials.
The Fiscalate as a whole was abolished by the Supreme Privy Council in 1729 by dismissing existing fiscal officers without appointing new ones. However, there were fiscals “for merchant affairs”, as well as military fiscals.
Prosecutor's office as a supervisory body
In January 1722, an attorney general was appointed to the Senate, and in April of the same year the “office of attorney general” was created.
It precisely lists the functions of the Senate Prosecutor General and the responsibilities of his assistant, the Chief Prosecutor. Here, in the very first paragraph, it was emphasized that the Prosecutor General must oversee the activities of the Senate. “The Prosecutor General is obliged to sit in the Senate and see to it that the Senate maintains its position, and in all matters that are subject to Senate consideration and decision, truly, zealously and decently, without wasting time, according to regulations and decrees...”
The need to verify execution was also emphasized here. The Prosecutor General must “carefully ensure that in the Senate things are not only done on the table, but that the decrees are carried out by the very action, in which he must ask those who received the decrees for what, whether they were carried out at the time at which the and its perfection can be fulfilled; and if it is not fulfilled, then he must know for what reason, whether some impossibility prevented it, or due to what passion, or laziness, and must immediately propose it to the Senate, for which he is obliged to have a book in which to write on one half, in on which day what decree took place, and on the other half write down when, what according to this decree was fulfilled, or not fulfilled, and for what, and other necessary circumstances to be entered.”
Clause 2 prescribed that if the Senate was found to have failed to fulfill its duties, “at the same hour... propose to the Senate explicitly, with a full explanation, in what they or some of them are not doing as they should, so that they can be corrected; and if they don’t listen, then he must protest at that hour, and stop this matter, and immediately convey to us, if it is very necessary...”
The law warns the Prosecutor General that “if (he) commits any wrongful denunciation out of any passion, he himself will be punished according to the importance of the matter.”
The law establishes: “the general and chief prosecutors are not subject to anyone’s court except ours.” However, the Senate retains the right to arrest these officials during the absence of the sovereign and initiate a search for them in the event of their treason (clause 9).
The Prosecutor General has the important right of legislative initiative in the absence of “clear decrees” on any issues.
Paragraph 11, as if summarizing everything that has been said about the duties of the prosecutor general, indicates that “this rank, like our eye and attorney for state affairs,” must “act correctly” in everything. Otherwise, “he will be punished first, and if he commits anything, or otherwise violates his position by knowledge or will, then, as a criminal of the decree and an obvious destroyer of the state, he will be punished.”
As if fearing that the Prosecutor General, in view of such a threat, will refrain from reporting in doubtful cases, the legislator establishes impunity for everything he does not intentionally, but by mistake: “it is better to make a mistake with a report than by silence.”
Prosecutor General The Senate office and all office work were subordinated.
As stated above, the fiscal authorities had to report to the prosecutor general. “The Prosecutor General must receive reports from the fiscals about what their position is... accept and propose to the Senate and instigate; also keep an eye on the fiscals and if you see anything bad, immediately report it to the Senate” (clause 4 of the “position of the prosecutor general”)
Fiscals who were attached to the same institutions were placed in the same attitude towards prosecutors who were attached to collegiums and other institutions. In cases of inaction of prosecutors, fiscal officials were obliged to report this to the chief fiscal officer, and he to the prosecutor general.
In 1722, the Senate was ordered to select, in addition to the Prosecutor General, also the Chief Prosecutor to be under him and the prosecutors who were on all boards. At the same time, it was allowed to select candidates “from all ranks, as far as the matter needs to be done.”
In the same year, prosecutors were appointed to court courts, and then to provincial institutions.
Prosecutors were required to monitor the execution of laws by public authorities, remind judges of their duties and stop their unfair orders. To do this, they were present at the meetings of the institutions at which they were located.
Prosecutors stopped the decisions of public offices with their protest and were obliged to report this to the prosecutor general no later than three days.
Being attached to individual institutions and monitoring the legality of their actions, prosecutors did not have their own special sphere of activity. It must be emphasized that criminal prosecution as a special act of government power lay outside the competence of prosecutors. Prosecutors monitored the progress of criminal cases in the same way as all other cases carried out in various institutions.
Until the abolition of the fiscal service, we can still talk about some leadership by prosecutors in the “accusatory” activities of fiscal officers, who are obliged to report all kinds of crimes. But with the abolition of the fiscal service, prosecutors also ceased to have any influence on the initiation of criminal prosecution. It was in the hands of the police and investigative judges.
All ranks of the prosecutor's office were not hierarchically dependent on each other; they were directly subordinate to the prosecutor general. They were, as it were, the “eye of the prosecutor general” on the ground; they received instructions from him. He was obliged to “supervise all prosecutors, so that they act truly and zealously in their rank, and if anyone commits a crime, then they should be judged in the Senate.”
Apart from the Senate, neither public offices, nor even the prosecutor general could subject prosecutors to penalties. In practice, this independence was sometimes violated by withholding salaries from those who were guilty, but the Senate considered this as an evasion of the legal order and confirmed the privileged jurisdiction of prosecutors.
For bribes or other violations of the law, prosecutors were subject to the strictest penalties. For intentional crimes, depending on the severity of the guilt, they were subject to either the death penalty or exile to hard labor with cutting out the nostrils and confiscation of all property. For unintentional violations of the laws, the first two times prosecutors were fined, and the third time - confiscation of half of the property and hard labor.
Among the positions that were partially elective in nature, greatest number The fiscal service raises questions, although several special works are devoted to it117. Fiscals, as bodies of secret supervision over the provincial administration, were created in the likeness of the fiscals that existed then in both Sweden and Prussia118.
They should have revealed
117 Barsov T. About secular fiscals and spiritual inquisitors // Journal of the Ministry of Public Education. 1878. No. 2. pp. 307-400; Anpilogov G.N. Fiscality under Peter I // Bulletin of Moscow University. Historical and philological series. 1956. No. 2. P. 63-80; Steshenko L.A. Fiscals and prosecutors in the system of state bodies of Russia in the first quarter of the 18th century. // Bulletin of Moscow State University. Series XII. Right. 1966. No. 2. P. 51-58.
118 S.E. Shestakov believes that Sweden has become the main standard. See: Shestakov S.E. Formation of the institution of civil fiscals in Russia in the first third of the 18th century. // Reforms in Russia XVI-XIX centuries: Sat. scientific works. M., 1992. P. 108.
crimes related to concealment from service, embezzlement, bribery and other violations of laws. The triumph of law and justice was achieved in an unspoken way: “Secretly supervise all matters and inquire about unjust trials, also in collecting the treasury and other things.” At the same time, the new services were placed in a special position. Fiscals were not subordinate to local authorities and were subject only to the Senate, which allowed them to boldly expose embezzlers and bribe-takers, regardless of positions and persons.
Before Peter I, there were no institutions that controlled the execution of decrees and carried out supervisory functions. They were replaced by the personal control of the tsar, complaints from the offended and frequent changes of governors, in which the government saw a way to combat malfeasance of the local administration1"9.
Fiscals were first mentioned in a decree on March 2, 1711 in connection with the entrustment of the Senate with the responsibility for justice and state revenues, for which it was ordered to “execute fiscals in all matters.” The next decree introduced the hierarchy of fiscal positions. The Senate was instructed to “elect an chief fiscal, an intelligent and kind person (from whatever rank),” who should “have under him several provincial fiscals for each case, and those under him also several lower ranks”120.
The importance attached to this service is evidenced by the fact that in 1713. Doctor of Law Baron G. Huyssen (educator of Tsarevich Alexei) developed a project for the creation of a Fiscal College, which did not receive practical implementation at that time121. The idea of creating a central fiscal institution was returned to after 12 years. In 1725, the Fiscal Chancellery was established in St. Petersburg (according to some sources, it existed already in 1723) headed by the fiscal general and his assistant, the state chief fiscal. This central institution in its tasks and structure (consisted of a presence and an office) resembled a collegium122.
119 Petrovsky S.A. Decree. op. pp. 98-100.
120 PSZ-1. T. 4. No. 2330 (item 9), 2331 (item 3). March 2 and 5, 1711; No. 2457 (clause 5). December 11, 1711
121 Polievktov M.A.
Huysen's project on the establishment of a fiscal college in Russia (1713). M., 1914.
122 PSZ-1. T. 7. No. 4698. April 20, 1725; No. 4794. October 22, 1725; Statehood of Russia. Book 4. M., 2001. P. 370-371.
During 1712-1714. the general principles of the fiscal service were further developed and by 1714. its meaning and organization were finally determined. As a result, the scope of activity of fiscal officials was clarified, their responsibility for false denunciations was introduced, and, finally, a centralized system of supervisory authorities was developed. Thus, under the Senate there should have been one chief fiscal with four assistants (including two from the merchants, in order to “secretly know the merchant class”). Each provincial government consisted of four fiscals, of which one was a provincial fiscal (“from which ranks are worthy, also from the merchants”), and in each city - one or two fiscals, depending on the number of inhabitants123. These positions were filled in different ways. The chief fiscal (then the fiscal general) was appointed or chosen from among the candidates presented by the Senate by Peter himself; Provincial fiscals were chosen by the chief fiscal, and city fiscals were chosen by city residents with the participation of provincial fiscals124.
The natural question is: From what classes were the city fiscals, who made up the majority of these employees, recruited? The answer contains a decree dated March 17, 1714, which ordered the provincial fiscal to travel around his province once a year in order to audit the activities of his subordinates. Having identified “indiligent fiscal officials” during the inspection, he had to instead “choose other people, kind and truthful, and consolidating those elections with his own hands, declare where he prevails (satisfies - L.P.); “Only not to accept young nobles, and those who are now such, should not be, but rather be middle-aged, namely from forty years and above, except for those who are from the merchant class”125.
Thus, city fiscals were elected by local residents from merchants and nobles, and the provincial fiscal who was present approved the election results, ensuring that among the newly elected there were no young nobles fit for military service. In 1718 Restrictions were also introduced for the merchant class: it was forbidden to choose fiscals from wealthy merchants126. The fact is that the fiscal service
exempted merchants from paying taxes, which were paid instead by the townsman community; The richer the merchant elected to the fiscal was, the more taxes fell on the rest of the community.
Judging by the decree of 1714, city fiscals were elected from nobles and merchants. Meanwhile, historians do not have a common point of view about the class composition of these employees. For example, T.V. Barsov wrote that one half of the city fiscals were chosen from the merchant class, the second from the nobility, and S.A. Petrovsky believed that “all city fiscal officials were chosen from the merchant class.” MM. Bogoslovsky, disagreeing with the last statement, cited convincing facts that not only merchants and nobles, but even peasants (in the northern regions) served as city fiscals. Moreover, city fiscals could either be elected by the population or appointed on the recommendation of the provincial fiscal"27.
Statistical material also testifies to the complex class composition of city fiscals. According to the calculations of G.N. Anpi-lair, in 1713 in the Moscow province alone there were 32 fiscals from nobles and 13 from merchants, and in 6 provinces (except St. Petersburg and Siberian) the fiscal service consisted of 140 nobles and a significant number of merchants. S.E. Shestakov, supplementing these data, writes that at the beginning of 1713. There were 159 service fiscals, mostly nobles128. The class origin of the fiscals was emphasized in their name, so there were “fiscals from the nobility” and “fiscals from the merchants.” These names were retained even when they became provincial fiscals.
In addition to representatives of these two class groups, there were simply “fiscals”, which were quite common among city fiscals (see Appendix 3). Who was included in this category of employees remains unclear, since there are no explanations either in the legislation or in the literature. It can be assumed that this was the name given to those who received this position by appointment of provincial fiscals, and not by choice of the urban population. It is also possible that they were quite numerous at that time “informers” from the townspeople and others
127 Barsov T. Decree. op. P. 315; Petrovsky S.A. Decree. op. P. 133; Bogoslovsky M.M. Regional reform of Peter the Great. pp. 299-300.
128 Anpilogov G.N. Decree. op. P. 67; Shestakov S.E. Decree. op. P. 115.
layers of the population who were enrolled in the fiscals at their request, albeit with precautions, after a thorough check of information129.
A significant difference between fiscals and civil servants was that they were fed by business and did not receive government salaries. Their service was difficult, even dangerous, but profitable. According to the law of March 5, 1711, upon confirmation of denunciation, fiscal officials received half of the fine or property of the lawbreaker (the second half went to the treasury). From 1714, the treasury continued to receive 10% of the total amount of the fine, but the share of the informer was halved, since 1A of all the money went to the maintenance of the fiscal apparatus and was distributed between the provincial fiscal and the city fiscals of the province where the denunciation came from, and " /20 of this quarter was allocated to the chief fiscal and his comrades130.
Having received the right to denounce, fiscal officers did not bear any responsibility for false denunciation. In the latter case, the law protected them from fair retribution and threatened “cruel punishment and ruin of the entire estate” for those who decided to “get annoyed” with them131. It is not surprising that those who held this position often abused their position, causing universal hatred. Already in March 1712. the guardian of the patriarchal throne S. Yavorsky subjected them to severe condemnation in his famous sermon, the senators called them nothing more than “street judges”, “antichrists and rogues”; among the people, the word “fiscal” was transformed into “whistled” and became a common noun. As a result, in 1714, although with reservations, fiscal responsibility for false denunciations was introduced132.
It says: “to carry out fiscal duties on all sorts of matters, but what to do when news is sent to them”. Three days later, on March 5, a new decree ordered the establishment of the position chief fiscal; he was to have secret supervision over all matters; he had to monitor whether an unjust trial had been carried out anywhere, whether an illegal act had been committed "in collecting the treasury and other things". "Whoever commits a lie", the chief fiscal had to report this to the Senate, and if he really convicted the culprit, then half of the fine went to the treasury, and half to the fiscal.
The Ober-Fiscal was the highest official in secret supervision of affairs; there were in the provinces provincial-fiscals, one for each branch of management; they had “lower”, urban ones “under them”. It was said about them all that they “they have the same strength and freedom in everything as the chief fiscal officers”.
High position by no means guaranteed against secret surveillance and summons to the Senate; everyone was subject to him, "no matter how high the degree is". High-ranking officials could only be involved by the chief fiscal; this was the only difference in the degree of power of the chief fiscal and ordinary fiscals.
With the establishment of the collegiums there appeared college fiscals, one for each board.
In August, N. M. Zotov was appointed state fiscal, that is “as an overseer, so that no one avoids duty or does anything else bad”.
But there were a lot of abuses, and there was a lot of scope for them. Provincial fiscals were independent of local authorities and were subordinate to their superiors, the chief fiscal. Obliged to inform, they were not persecuted for false denunciations; The decree directly states: “If you do not convict (the culprit, before the Senate), then the fiscal will not be blamed below to be annoyed, under cruel punishment and the ruin of his entire estate.”.
Stefan Yavorsky's attack against this institution is well known. On March 17, he made very clear hints about it in his sermon: “The law of the Lord is blameless, but the laws of men are defective; and some kind of law, for example, to appoint an overseer over the courts and give him the will of whomever he wants to expose, let him expose, whoever he wants to dishonor, let him dishonor...” etc. His words did not remain without influence. On March 17, a new order was issued in which the scope of action of the fiscals was defined much more precisely. They had to expose all kinds of crimes of decrees, all kinds of bribes and thefts of the treasury and everything that could lead "to the detriment state interest» , had to initiate cases for which there were no petitioners. For interference in court cases initiated by any of the parties, fiscal officials are punished. They are also persecuted for denunciations made for selfish purposes; if the denunciation turns out to be unfair, the fiscal bears the punishment that the person named by him would have suffered if he had been really guilty; The fiscal is also punished in cases where he did not report for his own selfish reasons.
The power of provincial fiscals was difficult to control; obliged to travel around the cities of the province once a year and check the actions of the lower fiscals, the provincial fiscals were invested with the power to remove them, subject them to penalties, etc., which again gave rise to abuses. In the city, their power was significantly constrained by the establishment of prosecutorial positions in all provinces. Prosecutors - this already open supervision of the court - not only limited their control over court cases, but were also generally an intermediary authority between them and the chief fiscal.
The institution of fiscals, discredited by the actions of its officials, was especially undermined by the abuses of its highest officials, the chief fiscals. The establishment of the position under Catherine I did not help matters either. fiscal general. The Supreme Privy Council under Peter II was busy investigating not only the crimes of the chief fiscals, but also the selfish acts of the fiscal generals.
Under Anna Ioannovna, fiscal taxes were abolished (). An institution aimed at secretly supervising all residents and all institutions could not bring any particular benefit; Fiscals were hated by everyone. The second chief fiscal officer, M.V. Zhelyabuzhsky, and his assistant A.Ya. Nesterov, soon after taking office, turned to the tsar with a complaint about the Senate, saying that they had a very bad time there: Senator G.A. Plemyannikov their otherwise "street judges" and didn’t call it, but Prince Yakov Dolgoruky directly called it antichrists And rogues.
But fiscal taxes undoubtedly brought some benefit. Nesterov's famous revelations (regarding Prince M.P. Gagarin, the same Dolgorukov, etc.) shed light on such abuses and crimes that without fiscal taxes would have completely eluded retribution. Nesterov also drew attention to the exploitation of small traders by rich merchants; were appointed merchant fiscals, obliged to secretly oversee the affairs of this class. However, Nesterov, this most active and intelligent of the highest-ranking fiscal officials, ultimately could not resist the temptation and was convicted of bribery and concealment.
Fiscals (military)- following the establishment of fiscals in the civil department, they were introduced into the troops by decree of the city. According to the Military Charter of 1716, regiments and fortresses had to have fiscal officers, divisions had to have chief fiscal officers with the rank of major, and the army had to have general fiscal officers with the rank of lieutenant colonel. According to the definition of the Military Regulations, the fiscal “there is an overseer over every rank, does he serve every position with truth and act in other matters entrusted to him?”. Fiscals were required to investigate and report crimes, support the prosecution in court and monitor the courts' compliance with the deadlines established by law for the consideration of cases; Fiscal officials only had to report violations of government interests to the commissariat. In cases where the accusation raised by the fiscals turned out to be unfounded, they could only be subject to light penalties for imprudence. By decree of February 22, 1723, the general-fiscals and chief-fiscals were raised in rank due to the fact that at first the fiscals were chosen “from the lowest people without certificates” and from among the chief-fiscals some turned out to be guilty "in great crimes and atrocities". Regimental fiscals by state
Now this word is used in Russian only in a negative sense. "Fiscal!" - this is what they call snitches and informers. But why are these people, despised by everyone, called fiscals, and not something else?
It turns out that in earlier times the word “fiscal” had a completely official meaning. This was once the name of the position of officials who were supposed to monitor the legality of the actions of institutions and individuals. This position was first introduced by Tsar Peter I, when he, by decree of February 22, 1711, established the Senate in Russia - the highest government agency governance of the country. Under him, a fixation service was also established.
The main fiscal for the entire state was called the chief fiscal. He had to secretly find out and look out to see if anyone was committing abuses in collecting taxes into the state treasury, how the trial was going and whether they were being judged correctly. His duties also included monitoring who said what and how they behaved, regardless of the person’s rank or position. The chief fiscal officer had to report all abuses to the Senate. Moreover, it was established that if the denunciation turns out to be fair and the person is punished with a fine or even all his property is taken away, then one half of the fine goes to the treasury, and the other remains to the chief fiscal for good service. But the fiscal was in no danger even if he turned out to be wrong. The people slandered by him, under the threat of cruel punishment, could not even be indignant at the slander, not to mention making claims or demanding his punishment.
Provincial fiscals worked under the control of the chief fiscal. They had the same rights in the provinces as the chief fiscal in the whole state, with the only difference that without the permission of the chief fiscal they could not summon important persons to court.
The provincial fiscals, in turn, were subordinate to the city fiscals.
Thus, fiscal officials of all ranks had to keep an eye on everyone, and other people were required to assist them in every possible way. So all residents were required to inform on each other both for the sake of the state and for their own. It was officially announced among the people that everyone would greatly benefit from denunciation. If someone, for example, denounces a person who has escaped from service, then as a reward he will receive full ownership of his village, and if someone notices that merchants are hiding their profits from taxes or are not trading in what they are supposed to, then he receives a fourth part of the merchant's total property.
This is how a whole service of informers appeared in Rus' called fiscals.
