Back in 1983... The era of perestroika in the Soviet Union left in the people's memory much more bitter than rosy memories. The time of great hopes ended with the collapse of the country, which left a negative imprint on the perception of this historical period. But the phrase “Boris, you’re wrong!”, which has become a catchphrase, is remembered with a smile even by those who, due to their age, remember little about that era. However, the question of what Boris was actually wrong about, who caught him wrong and how the phrase became part of folklore hangs in the air. Perhaps it’s worth starting from afar, from 1983, when new leader USSR Yuri Andropov, updating management personnel, brought to work in Moscow the 63-year-old first secretary of the Tomsk regional committee of the CPSU, Yegor Ligachev. For the realities of the first half of the 1980s, 63-year-old Ligachev, who, moreover, did not suffer from serious illnesses and had proven himself well in his previous position, was quite a young and promising politician. In Moscow, Ligachev took the post of head of the department of the CPSU Central Committee, and later became secretary of the CPSU Central Committee.

Lev Zaikov, Egor Ligachev and Mikhail Gorbachev. 1988 Photo: Boris Babanov Comrade Ligachev’s protégé Ligachev enjoyed the trust of Andropov, who entrusted him with further activities to recruit new personnel. In particular, Andropov advised taking a closer look at the 52-year-old First Secretary of the Sverdlovsk Regional Committee of the CPSU, Boris Yeltsin. Ligachev went to Sverdlovsk and was extremely pleased with what he saw, believing that Yeltsin was exactly the person the country needed in an era of change. True, Yeltsin’s nomination to work in Moscow took place only two years later - after Andropov’s death, the reform process that had begun stalled and resumed only in 1985, when Mikhail Gorbachev took over as leader of the USSR. Thus, on the recommendation of Yegor Ligachev, Sverdlovsk resident Boris Yeltsin found himself in big Soviet politics. In December 1985, Yeltsin was given the highest confidence - he was nominated for the post of first secretary of the Moscow City Party Committee, which made the politician one of the most influential people in the country. Soon, rumors spread throughout Moscow about the unusual democratic nature of the new leader of the capital: he allegedly personally got acquainted with the assortment of grocery stores, received treatment in a regular clinic, and even went to work by tram. Party disgrace and people's love Yeltsin's popularity began to grow by leaps and bounds, even exceeding the popularity of Mikhail Gorbachev. Either this turned the politician’s head, or personal ambitions awoke, but soon Yeltsin began to violently conflict with his party comrades. On October 21, 1987, at the Plenum of the CPSU Central Committee, Yeltsin sharply spoke out against the slow pace of perestroika, criticized his colleagues, including Ligachev, and even got to Gorbachev, declaring that a “cult of personality” was beginning to form around the Secretary General. The tone of Yeltsin’s speech did not even fit into the framework of the “perestroika” announced in the country. Party comrades, including those who sympathized with Yeltsin, declared his demarche “politically erroneous,” after which he fell into disgrace and was removed from his post as first secretary of the Moscow city party committee. In the traditions of the CPSU, it was not customary to wash dirty linen in public, therefore the text of Yeltsin’s speech was not published anywhere. But dozens of versions of this speech appeared in samizdat, which had nothing to do with reality. In some of them, Yeltsin almost cursed at Gorbachev and looked more like a longshoreman than a politician. It was with this legendary speech that Yeltsin’s fame as an oppositionist began. It was then that Soviet citizens, who began to become disillusioned with Gorbachev, began to perceive Yeltsin as an alternative to Mikhail Sergeevich.

Mikhail Gorbachev and Boris Yeltsin during the evening meeting of the extraordinary session of the RSFSR Supreme Council. A prophet in the ranks of the CPSU The times of perestroika in terms of internal party struggle were not as tough as previous eras, therefore the disgraced Yeltsin, having lost the post of “master of Moscow,” remained in the elite as the first deputy chairman of the USSR State Construction Committee. Yeltsin, who was having a hard time being removed from office, nevertheless, by the summer of 1988, realized that his current position as a “rebel” had many advantages, and began to develop the role of an “oppositionist.” On July 1, 1988, Yeltsin spoke at the 19th Party Conference. He attacked the privileges of senior government leaders, criticized the “stagnation” for which, in his opinion, the entire Politburo as a “collective body” was to blame, called for Ligachev to be removed from the Politburo, and ultimately appealed to the delegates to rehabilitate him for his speech at the Plenum. In the midst of Yeltsin’s speech, Ligachev intervened. The politician who once nominated the Sverdlovsk resident remarked: “You, Boris, are wrong.” We disagree with you not only on tactics. Boris, you have enormous energy, but this energy is not creative, but destructive! You put your region on coupons... Yeltsin ignored the remark and continued his speech. The phrase most likely would not have become a catchphrase if humorist Gennady Khazanov had not soon used it in one of his monologues “on the topic of the day.” In the thoroughly politicized USSR of the late 1980s, a joke related to the battle between the “people's hero” Yeltsin and the party nomenklatura immediately became extremely popular. From that moment on, it was adopted by Yeltsin’s supporters, who took to the streets with posters “Boris, you’re right!” and even “Rule, Boris!” The last wish soon came true. And the longer Boris ruled, the more prophetic Ligachev’s words seemed: “Boris, you have enormous energy, but this energy is not creative, but destructive!”... But this prophecy was no longer of any use. Yeltsin's destructive energy did its job. And the only good thing left for people to remember from that era was a catchphrase...

3.2. "Boris, you're wrong!"

You have energy, but your energy is not creative, but destructive.

E. K. Ligachev

Now few will remember why she was going and what exactly she decided. But the party conference began the awakening of political activity in the country. And the nomination of delegates to the party conference was the first attempt to change the Soviet election procedure.

In former times, both delegates and deputies were appointed by their superiors. Whoever is confirmed in the Central Committee will be there. In the spring of 1988 it was already different. Of course, the system for electing delegates was not very democratic. All party organizations could nominate their candidates, but the real selection took place at plenums of party committees, which weeded out those undesirable.

Nevertheless, a number of people known for their democratic beliefs were nevertheless elected.

Boris Yeltsin set himself the task at all costs to achieve election as a delegate to the 19th Party Conference and speak at it. This would be the beginning of a return to politics. He only dreamed about this.

He was nominated as a delegate candidate by many party organizations, but the authorities had every opportunity to prevent him from attending the conference. However, Gorbachev understood that this could not be done. Not giving Yeltsin a mandate means showing that no democratization is taking place in the party. Mikhail Sergeevich did not want this. And Yeltsin’s election as a delegate to the 19th All-Union Party Conference, without a doubt, occurred with his knowledge. At the same time, the Secretary General even turned a blind eye to the grossest violations of the election procedure.

Yeltsin was registered with the party in Moscow. However, the capital's communists refused to trust him with a delegate mandate.

An attempt to nominate him from his native Sverdlovsk did not go through, although the former leader’s candidacy was actively supported by the largest Ural enterprises - Uralmash, Verkh-Isetsky and Electromechanical plants.

“They came up with this system,” Yeltsin writes indignantly, “party organizations nominate many candidates, then this list goes to the district party committee, where it is sifted; then in the city committee of the party, there they sift again, finally, in the regional committee or the Central Committee of the Communist Party of the republic. Only those who, in the view of the apparatus, would not let them down at the conference and would speak and vote the way they should were left in a narrow circle. This system worked perfectly, and the Yeltsin name disappeared even on the approaches to the main leadership.”

Perhaps it was so. But then it is all the more unclear how the Central Committee allowed him to become a delegate from... Karelia, because even purely formally this was a violation of all the rules. He had no more relation to Karelia than to the Cape Verde Islands.

Gorbachev seemed to think differently. It’s okay that the procedure was violated, they looked at it, they say, where is this Karelia! But the Karelian delegates were sitting on the balcony, that is, the further Yeltsin was from the podium, the calmer it would be for Gorbachev. It is unlikely that anyone will suspect him that Yeltsin’s “revolutionary” speech at the party conference was coordinated and carefully prepared.

However, as presented by Lev Sukhanov, uninitiated in the subtleties true reasons including Yeltsin in the Karelian delegation, this was supposedly such a diabolical plan that the “manipulators from the apparatus” came up with. They could not ignore Yeltsin as a member of the Central Committee, so they included him in the Karelian delegation, because “they planned to “raise” it to the balcony - a kind of Kamchatka, from which it was almost impossible to break through to the podium, bypassing numerous KGB cordons.” . However, subsequent events do not fit at all; moreover, they contradict Sukhanov’s calculations.

It must be said that the 19th Party Conference was supposed to be a landmark, turning point event. A kind of stage.

It was planned to be broadcast live throughout the country. This means that any sharp speech would automatically become public. By the time the party conference opened, the country already knew that Yeltsin was among the delegates, and millions of television viewers waited with bated breath for his speech.

Yeltsin prepared seriously for the conference. As Sukhanov assures, he rewrote his future speech fifteen (!) times, invariably testing each new version on grateful listeners - relatives and assistants. For five or six nights he did not sleep at all: he was worried.

On June 28, the Kremlin Palace of Congresses was overcrowded. Yeltsin, without hesitation, was examined - some point-blank, some from the side - like an overseas, outlandish animal. Since the plenum of the Moscow City Committee - almost six months - he has not gone out to people.

How further events unfolded is perfectly described in the above-mentioned book by A. Khinshtein, and therefore we will give him the floor. However, let us recall that A. Khinshtein was a fierce opponent of the hypothesis of a “secret conspiracy” between Yeltsin and Gorbachev, according to which Yeltsin made his “revelatory” speech at the October (1987) Plenum of the CPSU Central Committee. What made him change his point of view 180 degrees, A. Khinshtein does not explain.

“Together with his Karelian comrades they put him in the gallery. However, this was the only detail that coincides with Sukhanov’s conspiratorial version. Everything else is from the evil one.

According to the regulations, Yeltsin’s speech was not scheduled. And with what fright should it have appeared there; an ordinary ordinary delegate - one of thousands? Not everyone made reports, not even members of the Politburo.

But Yeltsin really needs to break through to the podium. This is perhaps his last chance to return to big politics. And he writes note after note to the presidium: give the floor.

The reaction to them is zero. And then, on the final day of the conference, July 1, Boris Nikolaevich decides to make an outright demarche. Clutching the delegate mandate in his hand - like a banner above the Reichstag - he goes downstairs, straight to the podium. Hundreds of camera flashes accompany his triumphant forced march.

But where are those “numerous KGB cordons” that Sukhanov was worried about? Huh?

Yes, that’s the thing: there were no “cordons”. More precisely, security, of course, stood in the corners, but extended exclusively to journalists and staff. From a purely technical point of view, it was impossible to swaddle a delegate in front of an audience of thousands, with the whirring of video cameras and the clicking of cameras.

Yeltsin approaches Gorbachev with a stiff gait. (“He took the stand like Winter,” he will say later, not without humor.) The hall freezes. The speaker broadcasting something - the secretary of the Rostov regional committee Volodin - is interrupted mid-sentence. And in this instantly formed silence, Yeltsin’s hoarse voice is heard: “I demand that you give the floor to speak. Or put the question to a vote of the entire conference.”

And the Secretary General is a strange thing! - nods in agreement.

Medical diagnosis

“Hysterical syndrome most often occurs in extreme or conflict situations. Thanks to their liveliness and expressiveness, people with hysterical disorder easily establish relationships with others. Their emotions seem exaggerated and are aimed solely at attracting attention.”

“Invite Boris Nikolayevich into the presidium room,” Gorbachev orders his assistant Boldin, “and tell him that I will give him the floor, but let him sit down and not stand in front of the podium.”

However, Yeltsin refuses to go into the back room. He unceremoniously sits down in the front row and begins to wait patiently. Soon he is invited to the stage.

Well, where is the sinister conspiracy here? Where have the cunning intrigues of the “manipulators from the apparatus” disappeared?

One might think that Gorbachev did not understand how Yeltsin’s nomination as a delegate to the conference would end. Of course I understood. To expect obedience and non-resistance from Boris Nikolaevich would be sheer stupidity.

Why then did they let him into the hall? Why did you give the floor?

And how not to provide it - opponents object in response. Otherwise, they say, a public scandal would inevitably arise.

Completeness. Firstly, the scandal could have been avoided in the first place. Don't include him in the list of delegates, remove him from the Central Committee - and that's the end of it.

And secondly, such an experienced apparatchik as Gorbachev, even in these conditions, was quite capable of fooling Yeltsin around his finger.

They would have promised him the floor at the very end. And then they didn’t give it would. Forgot. They missed it. For clarity, some clerk would have been fired - for causing an irreparable offense to a member of the Central Committee, but after. When the passions would have subsided.

Or, meeting his wishes, they would put the issue of providing a platform to a general vote. The result could have been predicted in advance.

Moreover. Even in advance, Gorbachev knew perfectly well that Yeltsin would climb onto the podium.

Only later, after the August putsch, it would become clear that Yeltsin was tirelessly under the KGB’s hood. He was under secret surveillance, his phones were tapped, and the State Construction Office was stuffed with bugs.

(“Much of what we discussed in his office,” writes assistant Sukhanov, “immediately became public.” We had no doubt that we were within reach of the “big ear.”)

Considering that Yeltsin tested his report on his assistants in the office fifteen times - after each subsequent edit - even the text of the upcoming speech should have been known above.

The secretary of the Moscow city committee, Yuri Prokofiev, claims that in the evening, on the eve of the last meeting, the second secretary of the Moscow City Committee, Yuri Belyakov, called him at home and said that Yeltsin was expected to speak, and he, Belyakov, “asks me to speak out against him.”

That is, there was no trace of any “assault on Winter”. On the contrary, the Politburo was obviously ready for this forced march.

But instead, Boris Nikolaevich is kindly called to the microphone, and they even put tea in a glass holder in front of him.

First of all, Yeltsin decides to set the accents and play back previous mistakes. The occasion for this was excellent. Just the day before, one of the delegates, the head of the department of the Aerohydrodynamic Institute, Zagainov, rather sharply attacked his person, indignant at why Yeltsin was giving interviews to Western journalists, and not to the Soviet press? Zagainov also touched upon the story of the Moscow City Committee, saying that “his incomprehensible repentance at the plenum of the Moscow City Committee did not clarify his position.”

“We would like to hear his explanations at the conference,” he announced on behalf of ordinary communists. That's right - don't wake up the devil while it's quiet.

Yeltsin happily gives these explanations. He loudly announces that his interviews in Soviet publications are not allowed through censorship, so he has to communicate with foreign correspondents.

As for the “inarticulate” speech at the execution plenum of the city committee, he was “seriously ill, bedridden,” the doctors “pumped him full of medicines,” “and I sat at this plenum, but I couldn’t feel anything, and I couldn’t speak practically.” more".

Having finished with the introduction, Boris Nikolaevich proceeds, in fact, to the main part of the report - the one that was written and rewritten 15 times.

He is again in his usual accusatory and prosecutorial role. The audience freezes, listening to his escapades, bursting with applause from time to time.

Yeltsin says that the Central Committee apparatus has not been restructured, the party is lagging behind the people. Elections of leaders, including secretaries of the Central Committee and the General Secretary, must be universal, direct and secret, with a clear age limit - up to 65 years - and with the departure of the general, the entire Politburo must change.

To a roar of applause, he proposes to immediately get rid of the old ballast, “which has reached the fifth star and the crisis of society,” and to reduce the apparatus significantly, eliminating, in particular, the branch departments of the Central Committee. The party must become open, with a transparent budget and freedom of opinion.

A particular stir was caused by his accusations of total corruption and excessive privileges of the Bolshevik elite - “if something is missing here in a socialist society, then the lack should be felt equally by everyone without exception.”

“For 70 years we have not resolved the main issues,” Yeltsin throws out, “to feed and clothe the people, to provide services, to resolve social issues.”

At these moments, millions of people clung to their television screens and radio speakers. Yeltsin said exactly what almost everyone was thinking, but did not dare to admit publicly.

This was his true finest hour, and he himself, feeling it, decided to finally put a spectacular point.

“YELTSIN: Comrade delegates! A sensitive question. I wanted to address only the issue of political rehabilitation of me personally after the October plenum of the Central Committee.”

There is a noise in the hall, and Boris Nikolaevich, like a professional speaker, makes an elegant move.

“If you think that time no longer allows it, then that’s it,” he throws up his hands and is about to leave the podium, but Gorbachev intervenes.

“GORBACHEV: Boris Nikolaevich, speak, they ask. (Applause.) I think let’s take the mystery out of Yeltsin’s case. Let Boris Nikolaevich say everything he thinks he wants to say. And if something happens to you and me, we can say the same. Please, Boris Nikolaevich."

The Secretary General risked little. The experience of the October plenum and the City Committee auto-da-fé showed that at the very first wave of his hand, hundreds of politically sensitive party members would rush to the podium and again begin to trample the disobedient person into the mud. Every word Yeltsin said could easily be used against him. And Mikhail Sergeevich, in a good-natured manner, makes a broad, welcoming gesture.

In his short, emotional speech, Yeltsin asks to cancel the decision of the October plenum, in which his speech was recognized as erroneous.

Where did his former repentant timidity go? Now he declares that everything he said in October is confirmed by life itself. Yeltsin cites the moment of his speech as his only mistake - the eve of the 70th anniversary of the October Revolution. That is, claims can be made exclusively to the form, but not to the content.

“It will be in the spirit of perestroika,” Yeltsin exclaims, “it will be democratic and, it seems to me, will help it by adding confidence to the people.”

How ringing! It turns out that we are not talking about a particular case, not about a specific speech and an individual party member: about the fate of perestroika as a whole. To paraphrase Louis XIV, Boris Nikolayevich could well have added: “Perestroika is me.”

Medical diagnosis.

Manic syndrome is characterized by elevated mood, combined with unreasonable optimism, accelerated thinking and excessive activity. Along with verbosity, there is an overestimation of one’s own capabilities.

Yeltsin was seen off from the podium with applause. During the break, many came up to him, shook hands, and expressed support.” And here is how Boris Yeltsin himself describes this “historic” episode that happened on the final day of the party conference:

“I prepared for the performance quite combatively. In it he decided to raise the question of his political rehabilitation.

Later, when the 19th conference ended and I received a flurry of letters of support addressed to me, many authors reproached me with only one circumstance: why did I ask the party conference for political rehabilitation? “What, you didn’t know,” they asked me, “who the majority were elected to the conference, how the elections for it took place? Was it really possible to ask these people for anything?” “And in general,” wrote one engineer, it seems from Leningrad, “Woland said in Bulgakov’s “The Master and Margarita”: never ask anyone for anything... But you have forgotten this sacred rule.”

And yet I believe that I was right in raising this question before the delegates. It was important to outline my position and say out loud that the decision of the October plenum of the Central Committee, which recognized my speech as politically erroneous, was itself a political mistake and should be canceled. I didn’t have any big illusions that this would happen, but I still hoped.

In the end, real popular rehabilitation took place. In the elections to people's deputies, almost 90 percent of Muscovites voted for me, and nothing can be more expensive than this, the most important rehabilitation... The decision of the October plenum can be canceled or not - it no longer matters. It seems to me that this is now much more important for Gorbachev himself and the Central Committee.

But, however, I got ahead of myself. It was still necessary to obtain the right to speak. I understood that everything would be done to prevent me from entering the podium. Those who prepared the party conference clearly understood that it would be a very critical speech, and they did not want to listen to all this.

And so it happened. Day, two, three, four, the last day of the conference is already underway. I kept thinking about what to do - how to perform? The list is large, from this list, of course, there will always be someone to whom it is safe to give the floor, just not to give it to me. I send one note - no answer, I send a second note - the same thing. Well, then I decided to storm the podium. Especially after literally forty minutes before the break the chairman announced that after lunch the conference would move on to adopting resolutions and decisions. When I heard that my name was not on this list, I decided to take an extreme step. I addressed our Karelian delegation. I say: “Comrades, I have only one way out - I have to storm the podium.” We agreed. And I went down the long staircase to the doors that lead directly into the passage to the podium, and asked the security guys to open the door. And the KGB officers treated me, basically, I must say, quite well - they opened both doors, I pulled out my red mandate, raised it above my head and walked with a firm step along this long passage, straight to the presidium.

When I reached the middle of the huge Palace, the hall understood everything. The Presidium too. The speaker, I think from Tajikistan, stopped speaking. In general, there was a dead, eerie silence. And in this silence, with my hand outstretched, with a red mandate, I walked straight forward, looking into Gorbachev’s eyes. Every step resonated in my soul. I felt the breath of more than five thousand people, looking at me from all sides. He reached the presidium, climbed three steps, approached Gorbachev with a mandate in his hand and, looking into his eyes, said in a firm voice: “I demand to give the floor to speak. Or put the question to a vote of the entire conference.” There was some momentary confusion, but I stood there. Finally he said: “Sit in the first row.” Well, I sat in the first row, next to the podium. I see how members of the Politburo began to consult among themselves, whisper, then Gorbachev called the head of the general department of the Central Committee, they also whispered, he left, after which his employee came up to me and said: “Boris Nikolaevich, they ask you to go to the presidium room, with you there want to talk." I ask: “Who wants to talk to me?” - "Don't know". I say: “No, this option doesn’t suit me. I'll sit here." He left. Again the head of the general department whispers with the presidium, again there is some kind of nervous movement. An employee comes up to me again and says that now one of the managers will come out to me.

I understood that I couldn’t leave the hall. If I leave, the doors will not be opened for me again. I say: “Well, I’ll go, but I’ll see who comes out of the presidium.” I walk quietly down the aisle, and from the first rows they whisper to me, “No, don’t leave the hall.” Not reaching the exit three or four meters, I stopped and looked at the presidium. A group of journalists sat next to me, they also said: “Boris Nikolaevich, don’t leave the hall!” Yes, I myself understood that it was really impossible to leave the hall. No one rose from the presidium. The speaker continued his speech. The same comrade comes up to me and says that Mikhail Sergeevich promises to give the floor, but we need to return to the Karelian delegation. I realized that by the time I got there, by the time I got back, the debate would be curtailed and I wouldn’t be allowed to speak. So I answered - no, I asked the delegation for time off, so I won’t go back, but I like the seat in the front row - I like it. He turned sharply and sat down again in the center, near the aisle, directly opposite Gorbachev.

Was he really going to let me into the podium, or did he only later come to the conclusion that it would be a loss for him if he put the question to a vote and the audience came out in favor of giving me the floor? It's hard to say. As a result, he announced my speech and added that after the break we would move on to adopting resolutions.

I then tried to play through the options: what if the security officers had not opened the door, or the presidium had managed to persuade me to leave the hall, or Gorbachev, with his pressure and authority, had convinced the hall to stop the debate, what then? For some reason, I still have a strong belief that I would have performed anyway. Probably, then I would have directly appealed to the conference delegates, and they would have given me the floor. Even those who treated me badly, with suspicion or condemnation, even they were interested in what I had to say. I felt the mood of the audience and was somehow sure that they would give me the floor.

I went to the podium. There was a dead, almost oppressive silence. Started talking."

“I spoke. To some extent, the extreme stress took its toll, but nevertheless, it seems to me that I controlled myself, my anxiety, and said everything I wanted and had to say. The reaction was good, at least they applauded until I left the hall and went upstairs to the balcony to meet the Karelian delegation. At this time, a break was announced, my delegation showed me warm attention, someone tried to support me with a smile, someone with a handshake. I was excited, in tension, I went out into the street, delegates and journalists surrounded me and asked a lot of questions.

Suspecting nothing, after the break I sat down with my delegation. Now, according to the regulations, the adoption of resolutions and other decisions of the conference will begin. But it turns out that the break was used to prepare a counterattack against me and my performance.

Ligachev’s speech was memorable. It will later spread through anecdotes, reprises, performances, satirical drawings, etc. In the published transcript, they even had to correct his speech, the main ideologist of the country looked too mediocre. Whatever labels he hung on me, whatever he made up about me, despite all his vigorous efforts, it was petty, vulgar, uncultured.

It seems to me that it was after this speech that his political career successfully came to an end. He dealt himself such a crushing blow that he will never be able to recover from it. He should have resigned after the party conference, but he doesn’t want to. I don't want to, but I still have to. He, who has since caused nervous laughter among many, has nowhere to go.

Next performance. Lukin. Young first secretary of the Proletarian District Party Committee of Moscow. He diligently poured dirt on me, fulfilling the honorable task of his superiors. Then I often thought about him - how will he continue to live with his conscience?.. But in the end I decided that he would live wonderfully with his conscience, he has a tempered one. These young careerists, rising to the top, manage to tell so many different lies and screw up that it’s better not to mention conscience here at all.

Chikirev. Director of the Ordzhonikidze plant. It was he who made up a story about the first secretary, who supposedly threw himself from the seventh floor because of me, and besides that, he said a lot of other things. I listened to this and couldn’t understand whether it was a bad dream or reality. I visited his factory, once I even spent a whole day there with Minister Panichev. As always, I visited the canteen and the cabins, and at the end of the meeting made comments, he seemed to agree. And suddenly he said something that is simply impossible to retell, he lied, distorted the facts.

Quite unexpectedly for everyone, spoiling the planned scenario, Sverdlovsk resident V. A. Volkov came to the podium and said kind words to me. Before this, I never knew Volkov.

His impulsive, heartfelt performance is a natural human reaction to militant injustice. But the frightened first secretary of the Sverdlovsk regional party committee, Bobykin, sent a note to the presidium a few minutes later. I will quote it: The delegation of the Sverdlovsk regional party organization fully supports the decisions of the October (1987) Plenum of the CPSU Central Committee on Comrade Yeltsin. No one authorized Comrade Volkov to speak on behalf of the delegates. His performance was completely condemned. On behalf of the delegation - first secretary of the regional party committee Bobykin." But he did not consult with the delegation.

In conclusion, Gorbachev also said a lot about me. But still not so bazaar and unbridled.

Everyone who was nearby was afraid to even turn to me. I sat motionless, looking down at the podium from the balcony. It seemed like I was about to lose consciousness from all this... Seeing my condition, the guys on duty on the floor ran up to me, took me to the doctor, where they gave me an injection so that I could still stand it and see out the rest of the party conference. I returned, but it was both physical and moral torment, everything inside was burning, floating before my eyes...

It was hard for me to get through all this. Very difficult. I didn’t sleep for two nights in a row, I was worried, I thought - what’s the matter, who is right, who is wrong?.. It seemed to me that it was all over. I have no place to make excuses, and I wouldn’t. The meeting of the XIX conference was broadcast throughout the country by Central Television. I will not be able to wash myself off the dirt that was poured on me. I felt: they are happy, they beat me, they won. At that moment I felt a kind of apathy. I didn’t want any struggle, no explanations, nothing, just to forget everything, just to be left alone.

And then suddenly telegrams and letters were sent to Gosstroy, where I worked. And not ten, not a hundred, but in bags, thousands. From all over the country, from the farthest corners. It was some fantastic popular support. They offered me honey, herbs, raspberry jam, massage, etc., etc., so that I could heal myself and never get sick again. I was advised not to pay attention to the nonsense that was said about me, since no one believed in them anyway. They demanded of me not to become limp, but to continue the fight for perestroika.

I received so many touching, kind, warm letters from complete strangers that I couldn’t believe it all, and I asked myself where this came from, why, for what?..

Although, of course, I understood where these sincere feelings came from. Our people, who had suffered enough, could not calmly and without compassion watch how a person was mocked. People were outraged by the obvious, outright injustice. They sent these bright letters and thereby extended their hands to me, and I was able to lean on them and stand up.

So, the story of eight months ago repeated itself. Just like at the October Plenum of 1987, Yeltsin was given a public, demonstrative party flogging. The delegates who came to the rostrum of the party conference again branded him with shame and demanded that the lying voluntarist be brought to justice.

Immediately after Yeltsin's speech, a break was announced. But the break is over. According to the regulations, the conference was supposed to proceed to the adoption of documents, but M. Gorbachev, noting that the work of the conference was continuing, gave the floor to the first secretary of the Tatar regional committee of the CPSU G. Usmanov. He immediately stated that he must touch upon the issues that Yeltsin raised in his speech and, in particular, said:

“Still, I would like to dwell on two points from the first part of Comrade Yeltsin’s speech. As for his speech at the October (1987) Plenum of the CPSU Central Committee, he completely incorporated it into his speech today. As for the second part of Comrade Yeltsin’s speech, his political rehabilitation. All members of the Central Committee who took part in the work of the October Plenum are present here. Boris Nikolaevich said here that the only mistake he made was speaking at the wrong time.

Let's see: is this true? It seems that he chose the time then not by chance. He not only spoke, but also stated that he did not agree with the pace of the restructuring work being carried out, and asked for his resignation. Then Mikhail Sergeevich turned to him and said warmly in a fatherly way: “Boris, take your words back, gather your strength and continue to lead the very large authoritative Moscow party organization.” But Boris Nikolaevich categorically refused. And, as you know, the Moscow Party organization made its decision on this issue. We have no reason not to trust such an authoritative party organization in the capital. Moreover, Yeltsin, by his actions and deeds, does not work for the authority of the party and our country, giving out interviews to various foreign agencies right and left. He is published, he works for his authority.

Therefore, on behalf of our delegation, I do not support the request for his political rehabilitation. After all, wherever we work, we have another very serious duty: to strengthen in every possible way the unity and cohesion of our party - the key to success, our cementing force.”

Chairman of the All-Russian Central Council of Trade Unions S. Shalaev came to the podium next. He harped on about trade unions for a long time, tired everyone out, and was just about to move on to Yeltsin’s speech when he was reminded of the regulations - he had to leave the podium.

Taking this into account, the first secretary of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of Estonia, V. Väläs, immediately began to express his “purely personal opinion regarding the speech of Boris Nikolayevich Yeltsin.” He remembered his trip to Nicaragua as part of the delegation of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR, which was headed by the disgraced secretary

“Speaking at a textile mill (still a bad textile mill, we are helping to build) in front of the workers, perhaps out of thoughtlessness, perhaps out of fatigue, he said the phrase: “What, you don’t want to work? Go without pants." Alas, it was broadcast on television. And there was a translator nearby who translated everything correctly. It hurts, because there really are guys in Nicaragua who don’t have clothes yet. No clothes.

I think our party forum calmly, in a party way, solves problems on principle, for this we have party wisdom, we have endurance. But I say: a person who speaks before a high party forum must have a party conscience for this.”

Of course, everyone was waiting for what Yegor Ligachev would say. Yeltsin was also waiting for this speech. He saw Yegor Kuzmich, sitting on the podium, hastily sketching out the theses of his future speech. Then this speech will pass from hand to hand, and the phrase “Boris, you’re wrong” will become an aphorism. But all this will happen later. In the meantime, Gorbachev gives the floor to Comrade Ligachev, a member of the Politburo of the CPSU Central Committee, Secretary of the CPSU Central Committee.

The most striking speech was made, undoubtedly, by Yeltsin’s worst enemy, Yegor Kuzmich Ligachev. The phrase he uttered then remained forever in history and turned into an idiom - “Boris, you’re wrong!”

This is exactly how - Boris - not by his first name, patronymic or last name, Ligachev addressed his counterpart. In principle, his age allowed him to do this - he was eleven years older than Yeltsin - but such collective farm familiarity immediately caused people to reject him.

By the way, this famous phrase does not appear in the official transcript. But many witnesses claim that Ligachev’s speech was so emotional that the transcript had to be carefully corrected.

Of course, in an amicable way, Ligachev should not have spoken. They even tried to restrain him and convince him. But Yegor Kuzmich was adamant.

“No amount of persuasion from the members of the Politburo and the Secretary General, all of us, could keep him from going to the podium,” writes Politburo member Vadim Medvedev. - The speech was delivered in Ligachev’s characteristic offensive-rooster spirit, in the style of the prevailing “safe” stereotypes and contained a number of incorrect remarks, which set the teeth on edge with references to the brilliant Tomsk experience. In general, this speech only added points to Yeltsin.”

Frankly speaking, Ligachev did not discover anything new. He only listed and summarized all the negative things said about Yeltsin lately. In particular, he said:

“Perhaps it is more difficult for me than for anyone in the leadership to speak in connection with the speech of Boris Nikolayevich Yeltsin. And not because they were talking about me. It's just time to tell the whole truth. Why is it difficult to speak? Because I recommended him to the Secretariat of the Central Committee, then to the Politburo. (However, Yegor Kuzmich at another time took responsibility for Yeltsin’s appointment as head of the department of the Central Committee: “As for his further promotion, let others take it upon themselves.” - A.K.). Where did I come from? I proceeded from the fact that Boris Nikolayevich Yeltsin was an energetic man and at that time had extensive experience in leading the prominent Sverdlovsk regional party organization, respected by everyone in our party. I saw this organization at work when I came to Sverdlovsk as secretary of the Central Committee...

...We cannot remain silent because the communist Yeltsin has taken the wrong path. It turned out that he has not creative, but destructive energy. His assessments of the perestroika process, approaches and methods of work recognized by the party are untenable and erroneous. Both the Moscow City Party Committee and the Plenum of the Central Committee, at which he was in good health, came to this conclusion. More than 50 people spoke at the plenums of the Moscow City Committee and the CPSU Central Committee, and everyone unanimously made the well-known decision...

...There are reasonable proposals in his speech. But overall, it shows that he did not make the right political conclusions.

Moreover, he presented our entire policy as a complete improvisation...

...you, Boris, worked for 9 years as the secretary of the regional committee and firmly put the region on coupons. This is what political phrase and reality mean. This is what the discrepancy between word and deed means...

...it’s bad when a communist, a member of the Central Committee, without receiving the support of the party, appeals to the bourgeois press. Just as you can’t erase words from a song, you can’t erase this fact now. Apparently, Comrade Yeltsin wanted to remind himself of himself, to please him. They say about such people: they just can’t get past the podium. Boris, you love that all the flags come to you! Listen, if you are constantly busy with interviews, there is no time or energy left for anything else.

... being a member of the Politburo, present at its meetings, and the meetings last for 8 - 9 and 10 hours, he took almost no part in discussing the vital problems of the country and in making decisions that the entire people were waiting for. He remained silent and waited. It's monstrous, but it's a fact. Does this mean party camaraderie, Boris?

...Comrades, is it possible to agree that under the banner of restoring historical truth there is often a complete distortion of it? Is it possible to agree that Soviet people are in our printed publications! - presented as slaves (I almost quote), who were supposedly fed only lies and demagoguery and subjected to the cruelest exploitation?

...During the years of stagnation, I lived and worked in Siberia - a harsh, but truly wonderful land. People often ask me what I was doing at that time. I answer with pride: I built socialism. And there were millions of them. It would be a betrayal if I did not talk about those with whom I linked my destiny, shared joys and sorrows. Many of them have already passed away. Not everything worked out right away. They had to finish it and redo it, but they worked without looking back, perhaps because they knew that they wouldn’t send it further than Siberia. We worked to make people’s lives better, to give more to the state and to defend the interests of the region.

A party worker has one privilege - to be in front, to fight for party policies, to serve his people faithfully.”

Having trampled on Yeltsin to his heart's content, the dignitary speaker went to the other extreme and began praising the Secretary General and extolling perestroika, which ultimately resulted in him losing this battle. And the whole war in general. From now on, the name of Yegor Kuzmich was inextricably and firmly associated with the reactionary communist wing. He turned into a household figure, partly a caricature. An elderly dogmatist Bolshevik a la Suslov: perhaps without galoshes.

“He dealt himself such a crushing blow that he will never be able to recover from it,” Yeltsin noted.

Oddly enough, of the entire Politburo, Yegor Kuzmich turned out to be perhaps the only political long-liver. He even survived the Yeltsin era, because in 1999 he was elected to the State Duma on the list of the Communist Party of the Russian Federation (he was included clearly with only one purpose: to annoy the president), and as an elder he opened the first plenary session, sitting on the presidium next to Yeltsin, which is why both of them enjoyed definitely didn’t experience it... Not only that, contrary to Boris Yeltsin’s predictions, he not only “recovered from a crushing blow,” but twenty years later he wrote the book “Who Betrayed the USSR,” which became a notable political event of the post-Yeltsin and even post-Putin era, the circulation of which sold out literally in a matter of days. The book’s annotation states that: “The acute political battle between E. Ligachev and B. Yeltsin became a memorable event of the perestroika period. Unfortunately, Ligachev’s phrase “Boris, you’re wrong!” became prophetic for the fate of the state, which was soon headed by Yeltsin.”

In his book, E.K. Ligachev answered the question that served as its title: “I am constantly asked: who is the culprit of all those troubles that befell the people with terrible force? Time has given the answer to this difficult question - Gorbachev.

There was also a successor to Gorbachev's work - B.N. Yeltsin, who brought the citizens of the country richest in natural resources to impoverishment. He played this role to the fullest. At the 19th party conference in 1988, I said: “Boris, you’re wrong! … You have energy, but your energy is not creative, but destructive.” The prediction turned out to be correct. I would be happy if I was wrong."

The wise Yegor Kuzmich was not mistaken, and his famous phrase, which the “democrats” mocked at that time, turned out to be truly historical. However, the above quote from his book needs, in our opinion, clarification. No, it was not “found... the successor to Gorbachev’s work - B.N. Yeltsin...”, he was “calculated” and attracted by Gorbachev at the very beginning of perestroika as a shock, destructive force.

Yes, Yegor Ligachev, like Boris Yeltsin, also left the podium to thunderous applause. As we see, both had supporters. The editor-in-chief of Pravda, V. Afanasyev, sharply opposed Yeltsin at the conference. general manager NPO "Machine-Tool Plant named after Sergo Ordzhonikidze" N. Chikirev, First Secretary of the Proletarsky District Committee of the CPSU of Moscow I. Lukin. They presented specific claims to Yeltsin.

Chikirev N.S. “When Comrade Yeltsin came to us in Moscow, he was received very well. He was received with great support and great attention. When he visited plants and factories, we saw his efforts. We saw that he really wanted Moscow to have food and for us to work better.

He was at my plant for 6 hours and made the only remark that I consider absolutely unfair. I don’t want to express it for the reason that it is absolutely incompetent - to see it for the first time in a person’s life and express something that he did not have the right to express to me. This is the first.

I think that the team in which I grew up knows me better than Comrade Yeltsin knew.

At the latest district party conferences, a new composition of district committees and their leadership were elected. Not long before this, Comrade Yeltsin was elected to the Moscow City Committee. All the secretaries of the district party committees - and I am a member of the city committee for more than one term, I worked in the Komsomol and the party for many years - were elected under Comrade Yeltsin. And after that, in a very short time, in just a year, he replaced 23 first secretaries out of thirty-three with the help of a sycophant who sat in his organizational department. I don’t think that Comrade Yeltsin was such a perceptive person that in six months he could recognize the secretaries and do so much. This is one fact. Here's the second fact. If he told us today about 1937, then my family also went through a lot. So, the secretary of the district party committee, who grew up before our eyes, an extremely honest and conscientious person, jumped out of the window after an undeserved reprimand for the poor supply of food to the region. But in the Kiev region it is not very easy to establish this business. In the morning, two trains arrived at the Kyiv station, and the Kyiv district was again without food. So try to establish supplies in the Kiev region. I live near this area. At the bureau of the city committee they dismantled it, they gave me a “sterner,” and after that the comrade jumped from the eighth floor. An honest man, whom Moscow knew, whom we, members of the city party committee knew, and whom the secretaries of district committees knew, died. How is this better than 1937? This man was not Shchelokov, he was not Rashidov. He was a communist, a dedicated communist. Let Comrade Yeltsin carry this death in his heart.”

Lukin I.S. First Secretary of the Proletarsky District Party Committee of the city of Moscow: “I am a young first secretary, elected a little over a year ago, and I cannot classify myself among those who are offended by Comrade Yeltsin. But, judging by other speeches from this rostrum and some, as I believe, not quite mature applause, I feel that there is still hypnosis of Yeltsin’s phrase.

When I heard him in 1984 at a scientific and practical conference (I was in the hall, he was on the presidium), it also seemed to me that he was, so to speak, a brilliant speaker, interesting person. But now the hypnosis has dissipated. During your leadership of the city party organization, Comrade Yeltsin, I came across your style and methods of work.

I am convinced that the attempt to force perestroika literally led to the breakdown of the party organization in Moscow. You, speaking about yourself, spoke about the “shadow of the distant past.” Are your methods of working with personnel in Moscow, primarily party members, not a “shadow of the distant past”? The first secretaries of the Kuibyshev, Kyiv, Leningrad and many other district party committees not only left, but were actually broken and spiritually destroyed. Your callous attitude towards people was manifested in the endless replacement of personnel. My predecessor, an honest and decent man, was also forced to leave: his health could not stand it.

And in the economic life of the city, we are still disentangling your desire to become famous for your bright promises to Muscovites. But the main thing in your style is the desire to please the masses. You choose one method - to drive a wedge between the party committees and the working class, the intelligentsia. That’s what you did in Moscow, and that’s what you tried to do today, actually driving a wedge between the conference delegates, the hall and the presidium. This, Comrade Yeltsin, you will not succeed. It won't work!

I am convinced, comrades, that today it is too early to talk about political rehabilitation. You, Comrade Yeltsin, apparently have not yet drawn any conclusions. I am also convinced that the delegates of our conference will be able to recognize a bright phrase in any package, a desire to express their own ambitions. And our conference today is a guarantee of this.”

M. Gorbachev gave the floor to speak only to those on whose support he counted. The presidium received notes asking for the floor from many delegates. But these notes were carefully sorted. Nevertheless, one of the delegates - the secretary of the party committee of the Kalinin Machine-Building Plant from Sverdlovsk, V. Volkov - like Yeltsin - stormed the podium and said a few words in defense of his disgraced fellow countryman. “I think I wouldn’t be the only one who would have a hard time at heart if everything remained as it was after the speech of Comrade Ligachev’s Yeltsin.

Yes, Yeltsin is a very difficult person, he has a difficult character; he is a tough man, maybe even cruel. But this leader, working in the Sverdlovsk regional party organization, did a lot for the authority of the party worker and the party, he was a man whose word did not differ from his deeds. Therefore, even today he remains a high authority among ordinary people.

I believe that the Central Committee of the Party damaged its authority when the materials of the October Plenum were not published. This gave rise to a lot of rumors that only harmed the matter.

I don’t agree with Comrade Ligachev’s statement about the cards either. Unfortunately, today there is no such thing as it was with food under Yeltsin.

Our region ranks third (maybe I’m wrong, of course, but somewhere third) in Russia in terms of industrial production volume. And our rural population is proportionally very small compared to other regions.

What else do I want to say? We are not familiar with Yeltsin’s speech at the October Plenum, and therefore it is difficult for us today to make a decision on rehabilitation, on changing the assessment that the Plenum of the Central Committee gave. But there is still no need to attach labels.

Comrade Yeltsin in his speech practically raised most of the questions that had been raised before him in speeches. At least a lot of them. Therefore, I want to say again (and I think that I will be supported by members of the Sverdlovsk delegation) that Yeltsin did a lot for the Sverdlovsk region, where even today his authority is very high.”

As we have already noted, in his memoirs Boris Yeltsin claimed that he left the party conference with a heavy heart. He seemed to be afraid that people would believe the bucket of dirt poured on him:

“I didn’t sleep for two nights in a row, I was worried, I thought - what’s the matter, who is right, who is wrong?.. It seemed to me that it was all over. I have no place to justify myself, and I wouldn’t... I won’t be able to wash myself of the dirt that was poured on me. I felt: they are happy, they beat me, they won. At that moment I felt a kind of apathy. I didn’t want any struggle, no explanations, nothing, just to forget everything, just to be left alone.”

We must assume that we are dealing with another example of Yeltsin’s coquetry. Of course, he was worried, and he probably didn’t sleep at night. But his emotions invariably went hand in hand with cold calculation.

Yeltsin understood perfectly well that the sympathies of the majority would be on his side. For the first time - publicly, throughout the country - he voiced the thoughts of millions. As for the flogging that was arranged, this is even better - we love the offended.

Very soon thousands of letters and telegrams were sent to Gosstroy. Every day new bags of correspondence were brought to Yeltsin’s reception room. People from different parts of the Union expressed their sympathy and support for him, sending him jam and medicinal herbs.

And most importantly, unlike the October plenum, when Yeltsin’s speech was hidden from society, his current forced march has already become the property of millions, since it happened before their eyes.

If Yeltsin’s political rehabilitation did not happen, then a completely different, perhaps much more important, popular rehabilitation took place.

From now on, all the country's eyes were focused not on Gorbachev, but on Yeltsin; it was he who became the ruler of thoughts, the spokesman of popular discontent. Boris Nikolayevich confidently moved to the forefront of the political struggle... And he was helped in this, quite deliberately, by none other than Mikhail Sergeevich Gorbachev, whose behavior at the last party conference once again convincingly confirmed that they acted according to a clearly developed plan for the liquidation of the CPSU and the collapse Soviet Union.

The reproach against Boris Yeltsin turned out to be a prophecy that no one heard.
Member of the Politburo of the CPSU Central Committee Yegor Ligachev. 1990

Back in '83...

The era of perestroika in the Soviet Union left in the people's memory much more bitter than rosy memories. The time of great hopes ended with the collapse of the country, which left a negative imprint on the perception of this historical period.
But the phrase “Boris, you’re wrong!”, which has become a catchphrase, is remembered with a smile even by those who, due to their age, remember little about that era. However, the question of what Boris was actually wrong about, who caught him wrong and how the phrase became part of folklore hangs in the air.
Perhaps it’s worth starting from afar, from 1983, when the new leader of the USSR Yuri Andropov, updating management personnel, brought the 63-year-old first secretary of the Tomsk Regional Committee of the CPSU Yegor Ligachev to work in Moscow.
For the realities of the first half of the 1980s, 63-year-old Ligachev, who, moreover, did not suffer from serious illnesses and had proven himself well in his previous position, was quite a young and promising politician. In Moscow, Ligachev took the post of head of the department of the CPSU Central Committee, and later became secretary of the CPSU Central Committee.
Lev Zaikov, Egor Ligachev and Mikhail Gorbachev. 1988

Protégé of Comrade Ligachev

Ligachev enjoyed the trust of Andropov, who entrusted him with further activities for the selection of new personnel. In particular, Andropov advised taking a closer look at the 52-year-old First Secretary of the Sverdlovsk Regional Committee of the CPSU, Boris Yeltsin.
Ligachev went to Sverdlovsk and was extremely pleased with what he saw, believing that Yeltsin was exactly the person the country needed in an era of change.
True, Yeltsin’s nomination to work in Moscow took place only two years later - after Andropov’s death, the reform process that had begun stalled and resumed only in 1985, when Mikhail Gorbachev took over as leader of the USSR.
Thus, on the recommendation of Yegor Ligachev, Sverdlovsk resident Boris Yeltsin found himself in big Soviet politics.
In December 1985, Yeltsin was given the highest confidence - he was nominated for the post of first secretary of the Moscow City Party Committee, which made the politician one of the most influential people in the country.
Soon, rumors spread throughout Moscow about the unusual democratic nature of the new leader of the capital: he allegedly personally got acquainted with the assortment of grocery stores, received treatment in a regular clinic, and even went to work by tram.

Party disgrace and people's love

Yeltsin's popularity began to grow by leaps and bounds, even exceeding the popularity of Mikhail Gorbachev. Either this turned the politician’s head, or personal ambitions awoke, but soon Yeltsin began to violently conflict with his party comrades.
On October 21, 1987, at the Plenum of the CPSU Central Committee, Yeltsin sharply spoke out against the slow pace of perestroika, criticized his colleagues, including Ligachev, and even got to Gorbachev, declaring that a “cult of personality” was beginning to form around the Secretary General.

The tone of Yeltsin’s speech did not even fit into the framework of the “perestroika” announced in the country. Party comrades, including those who sympathized with Yeltsin, declared his demarche “politically erroneous,” after which he fell into disgrace and was removed from his post as first secretary of the Moscow city party committee.
In the traditions of the CPSU, it was not customary to wash dirty linen in public, therefore the text of Yeltsin’s speech was not published anywhere. But dozens of versions of this speech appeared in samizdat, which had nothing to do with reality. In some of them, Yeltsin almost cursed at Gorbachev and looked more like a longshoreman than a politician.
It was with this legendary speech that Yeltsin’s fame as an oppositionist began. It was then that Soviet citizens, who began to become disillusioned with Gorbachev, began to perceive Yeltsin as an alternative to Mikhail Sergeevich. Mikhail Gorbachev and Boris Yeltsin during the evening meeting of the extraordinary session of the RSFSR Supreme Council

Prophet in the ranks of the CPSU

The times of perestroika in terms of internal party struggle were not as tough as previous eras, therefore the disgraced Yeltsin, having lost the post of “master of Moscow,” remained in the elite as the first deputy chairman of the USSR State Construction Committee.
Yeltsin, who was having a hard time being removed from office, nevertheless, by the summer of 1988, realized that his current position as a “rebel” had many advantages, and began to develop the role of an “oppositionist.”
On July 1, 1988, Yeltsin spoke at the 19th Party Conference. He attacked the privileges of senior government leaders, criticized the “stagnation” for which, in his opinion, the entire Politburo as a “collective body” was to blame, called for Ligachev to be removed from the Politburo, and ultimately appealed to the delegates to rehabilitate him for his speech at the Plenum.
In the midst of Yeltsin’s speech, Ligachev intervened. The politician who once nominated the Sverdlovsk resident remarked:
- You, Boris, are wrong. We disagree with you not only on tactics. Boris, you have enormous energy, but this energy is not creative, but destructive! You put your region on coupons...
Yeltsin ignored the remark and continued his speech.

The phrase most likely would not have become a catchphrase if humorist Gennady Khazanov had not soon used it in one of his monologues “on the topic of the day.” In the thoroughly politicized USSR of the late 1980s, a joke related to the battle between the “people's hero” Yeltsin and the party nomenklatura immediately became extremely popular.
From that moment on, it was adopted by Yeltsin’s supporters, who took to the streets with posters “Boris, you’re right!” and even “Rule, Boris!”
The last wish soon came true. And the longer Boris ruled, the more prophetic Ligachev’s words seemed: “Boris, you have enormous energy, but this energy is not creative, but destructive!”...
But there was no sense in this prophecy anymore. Yeltsin's destructive energy did its job.
And the only good thing left for people to remember from that era was a catchphrase...

http://back-in-ussr.com/2016/07/boris-ty-ne-prav-istoriya-kr...

Heroes of the 90s. People and money Soloviev Alexander

"Boris, you're wrong"

"Boris, you're wrong"

First Deputy Chairman of the USSR State Construction Committee Boris Yeltsin, at the 19th Conference of the CPSU on July 1, 1988, sharply criticized the central apparatus of the party, which did not keep up with the perestroika processes in the country, spoke in favor of extending openness to the internal life of the party, and proposed introducing general, direct, secret elections of leading party members organs. Politburo member Yegor Ligachev, who was sitting on the presidium of the conference, interrupted Boris Yeltsin’s speech, declaring into the microphone: “You, Boris, are wrong. We disagree with you not only on tactics. Boris, you have enormous energy, but this energy is not creative, but destructive! You put your region on coupons...” Not paying attention to Ligachev’s remark, Yeltsin continued his speech. The Russians liked the phrase, and later they remembered it more than once.

From the book Don't Say No author Azhippo Vladimir Andreevich

Protecting your rights Once you are deprived of your freedom, you will begin to feel the violation of your rights especially acutely. Moreover, this will be perceived as a violation of not one or two, but all your rights at the same time: you were illegally detained, illegally held for a day or two without drawing up documents, not

From the book Magazine Q 03 2009 author Q Magazine

Obama, you're right! Contr-TV.ru Recently I tried to figure out the mechanism of the current financial crisis. I have suggested that the pumping of imputed utility into individual goods, services or property derivatives is the main mechanism of monetary dysregulation,

From the book Computerra Magazine No. 713 author Computerra magazine

From Google Book. Past. Present. Future by Lau Janet

Copyright Infringement The attempt to implement a grandiose plan to digitize all the books in the world so that these treasures of knowledge would become available to millions of people on the Internet turned out to be a serious problem for Google - it was regarded as copyright infringement

From the book of the USSR. 100 questions and answers author Proshutinsky V

GUARANTEE OF CIVIL RIGHTS AND THEIR PROTECTION “What new rights of citizens are enshrined in the Constitution of the USSR of 1977?” - The new Constitution not only legislated the socio-economic and political rights that arose during the construction of a developed

From the book Secrets of the Afghan War author Lyakhovsky Alexander Antonovich

When Tanay was wrong... The revolutionary government repulsed all the attacks of the irreconcilables at Khost. In the second half of 1989, another unexpected event occurred. G. Hekmatyar, together with his largest grouping, the IPA, emerged from the so-called “transitional

From the book Black Square author Malevich Kazimir Severinovich

From the book Strategy and Tactics in the Art of War author Zhomini Genrikh Veniaminovich

Paragraph I Offensive wars to restore rights When one state has claims on another, coercion by force of arms may not always prove in the best possible way their implementation. Public opinion should be sought before the start of combat

From the book The Times of Anton. Fate and pedagogy A.S. Makarenko. Free thoughts author Fonotov Mikhail Savvich

From the book “White Book” of human rights violations and the rule of law in Ukraine - 3 author Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Russian Federation

7) Violation of economic, social and cultural rights Universal Declaration of Human Rights (December 10, 1948)Article 171. Every person has the right to own property, either alone or in association with others.2. No one should be arbitrarily deprived of their

From the book Articles and speeches about Ukraine: collection author Stalin Joseph Vissarionovich

DECLARATION OF THE RIGHTS OF THE PEOPLES OF RUSSIA The October Revolution of workers and peasants began under the common banner of emancipation. The peasants are emancipating themselves from the power of the landowners, because there is no longer landlord ownership of land - it has been abolished. Soldiers and sailors are liberated from

From the book 1937: Don’t believe the lies about “Stalinist repressions”! author Eliseev Alexander Vladimirovich

Who was right? In conclusion, I cannot help but touch upon the “German question”. We saw the presence of strong anti-German and at the same time “pro-Entente” sentiments in the Soviet elite. Many readers will inevitably have a question: “Or maybe it’s just the position of Litvinov and

From the book Power and Conscience [Politicians, people and nations in the labyrinths of troubled times] author Abdulatipov Ramazan

Was I right? My time did not spare the heroes, It did not distinguish who was right and who was wrong, My time buried the heroes, Without giving them military honors. Rasul Gamzatov From the transcript of the third session of the Supreme Council of the RSFSR. Thirteenth meeting of the House of Soviets of the RSFSR. Meeting room of the Supreme Soviet

From the book The Fisher Riddle author Mansurov Evgeniy Alexandrovich

III maybe he's right? J. COLLINS (USA): “If Fischer settled on something, he was unshakable in his decision. Many tried to convince him, but I never did. Even when most people thought that Bobby was completely mistaken, he most often

From the book France without lies by Clark Stefan

Am I right or wrong? A favorite technique of a Frenchman who wants to demonstrate how right he is is to use a rhetorical question. Why? Yes, because such a question emphasizes his rightness. Why do the French use it so often? Yes because he gives them

From the book Mortal Confrontation of Nazi Leaders. Behind the scenes of the Third Reich author Emelyanov Yuri Vasilievich

“The Fuhrer is always right. Obey the Fuhrer.” The start of the World War did not cause delight among the overwhelming majority of Germans. W. Shirer wrote in his Berlin Diary on September 3, 1939: “As far as I know, the excitement in Berlin on the first day of the First World War was enormous.

P.S.. I tried to publish these most interesting and instructive reflections of the Patriarch of the Communist Party Yegor Ligachev from “Soviet Russia” on the 25th anniversary of the beginning of perestroika on the portal’s news feed. I was advised to post them on my blog.
I think it is useful for all of us to return to that time again. Time to hope for the best. The time when perestroika had not yet turned into a shootout (I give the article with some abbreviations).

Perestroika, which began exactly 25 years ago with the April Plenum of 1985, was necessary. He reflects on why perestroika was needed, whether it had a program, why it failed, and what lessons should be learned from it. member of the Politburo of the CPSU Central Committee of those years E.K. Ligachev.

Socialist restructuring was necessary, possible, feasible. The country approached the 80s with powerful economic and cultural potential, enormous influence on the course of world development. It was a time of creation that had nothing in common with the “era of stagnation,” as our opponents slandered that period. At the same time, difficulties grew in the country, the gap between the USSR and developed countries West in the field of labor productivity, efficiency of production of civilian products, socialist democracy lagged behind in its development, the effective demand of the population for high-quality consumer goods was not ensured, questions accumulated in the relations between the center and union republics.

In my speech in the Kremlin in 1986, I said the following: “This is not about changing the essence of our social system. On the contrary, this process is aimed at strengthening and developing the fundamental socialist principles in order to reliably ensure a new sustainable rise in the economy and the well-being of the people.” So, perestroika was conceived as a socialist renewal, without any dismantling of socialism.

For the newly-minted “democrats” who had not created anything significant in life, perestroika meant the destruction of the Soviet system and its replacement with capitalism. M.S. Gorbachev, apparently in order to justify the betrayal of socialism and the suffering caused to the people, put forward at the end of perestroika the idea of ​​​​the unreformability of the Soviet social system and the impossibility of improving it. These are two directly opposite positions.

The comrades who say that perestroika had neither goals nor a program are wrong. The goal of perestroika was to create a highly efficient economy, further improve the material life of people, and expand the real participation of workers in government. To achieve these goals, main directions were identified, programs were developed, and material and financial resources were allocated. The main economic element of the perestroika program was defined as “modernization and accelerated growth of the machine-building complex” and on this basis, subsequent reconstruction of the national economy and social reorientation of the economy with the widespread use of the achievements of developing science.

In the twelfth five-year plan (1986–1990), 200 billion rubles were allocated for the modernization program of the mechanical engineering complex, and primarily machine tool building and electronics, twice as much as in the previous ten years. In order to satisfy the growing effective demand of the population, 70 billion rubles were allocated for the creation of modern light and food industry, that is, more than in the entire forty-year post-war period.
The five-year plan provided for the conversion of the defense industry to the production of civilian products. These plans were successfully implemented in the first period of the five-year plan.

Perestroika is often portrayed as a complete failure from start to finish. This is not true, not true at all. The restructuring of the national economy, as the central link of the entire policy of socialist renewal of society, went through two stages.

At the first stage of perestroika (1985–1988), when transformations took place within the framework of socialism, the growth of negative trends in the economy and society as a whole was stopped, and a new rise in the national economy based on scientific and technological progress was begun. The labor and social activity of citizens and support for the decisions of the party and the Soviets have increased.
The growth rate of industrial production increased by 5% compared to 3% in the Eleventh Five-Year Plan, in agriculture– 3% and 1%, respectively. In the twelfth five-year plan, the highest grain harvest in the entire history of agriculture was obtained; the average annual production of grain was 27 million tons more than in the previous five-year plan, and milk - by 10 million tons.

During the twelfth five-year plan, more housing was built than during any other five-year plan, the increase compared to the eleventh five-year plan (1981–1985) was almost 20%, and schools, kindergartens, hospitals, clubs - 15–51%. With a general increase in industrial production in 1988 of 13%, the volume of mechanical engineering - the main link in the party's economic strategy - increased by 19%. The country's population increased annually by 2 million people; after the collapse of Soviet power, the population of Russia alone began to decline by 700 thousand people annually.
Subsequently, creation was replaced by destructive processes.

Second stage of perestroika(1988–1991) – disorganization of the economy, the consumer market, rising prices, worsening shortages of goods, strikes, national conflicts, defeat of the Communist Party. Perestroika ended in 1991 with a counter-revolutionary coup d'etat and the destruction of the Soviet Union. After 1991, this is a different period of history - the restoration of capitalism.

What are the causes of a social catastrophe unprecedented in history??
There is no clear opinion here either. Some believe that this is mainly the action of external forces - imperialism, others - internal factors. There are voices that supposedly there was no socialism in Russia, and the role of Gorbachev and Yeltsin is assessed “as a historical feat in the elimination of totalitarianism.” Meanwhile, violations of socialist legality were exposed and eliminated by the party itself, the communists.
The cause of the destruction of the Soviet Union, communist party, liquidation of Soviet power is a betrayal of the leadership group of persons- careerists, nationalists, their political degeneration, thirst for personal enrichment through the robbery of people's property and undivided control of the state. The Communist Party and the Soviet government did not allow either one or the other. They all became dollar millionaires and billionaires.

Another factor in the destruction of the country is a sharp weakening of planned management of the national economy, the introduction of market relations without preparation - first in the form of free, negotiated prices, and then the denationalization of property (transferring it into private ownership), the creation of so-called cooperatives. All this, taken together, led to a violation of the proportions of production and consumption, a significant excess of the growth rate of wages over the growth rate of labor productivity, and the money supply over the commodity supply. In turn, this resulted in a sharp increase in the shortage of goods for the population, disruption of the socio-economic complex, and discontent among the population
The rate of wage growth was 2 times faster than the rate of increase in labor productivity, cash income increased over the five-year period by 60%, and the production of consumer goods by 19%, which led to the emptying of stores.
The sale of a significant part of the products produced at free, negotiated prices between producers and consumers, due to the developed monopoly in the production of certain products (with planned economic management, this is not dangerous), led to unprecedentedly high prices and an increase in the amount of profit. Moreover, the profit, as a rule, was spent not on the development of production, not on its technical re-equipment, but on distribution.

Great damage to the economy and morality was caused by distortions of Lenin’s idea about the role of cooperation in the construction of socialism. In organized cooperatives, according to the adopted resolution, the owners of private property were hidden behind the collective shell, and the rest were hired workers. They became a refuge for shadow capital, and a group of big bourgeois and oligarchs emerged from here. Instead of using cooperatives to organize small commodity producers, they began to create them on the basis of leasing or purchasing the property of state enterprises. Moreover, the products were mainly sold not to the population, but to state-owned enterprises at high prices.

Denationalization and the establishment of private property were necessary for those who worked to destroy the Soviet system. After the coup d'etat, Yeltsin-style privatization led to the decline of the economy and the loss of public property - the economic basis of Soviet power.

And yet this is not all when it comes to the origins of the dismemberment of the Soviet Union. Main reason destruction of the Soviet country - undermining the ideological and organizational foundations of the CPSU, the formation of groups and platforms in it and the elimination of its leadership role. Things got to the point that at the XXVIII Congress of the CPSU (1990), the adopted new Party Charter stated “the right of communists to unite according to platforms during discussions.” Meanwhile, Lenin’s resolution “On Party Unity” prescribed the exclusion of factionalists from the party and the immediate dissolution of any factions or platforms.

The faction “Democratic Platform”, “Marxist Platform”, and left-of-center groups arose in the CPSU. The “Democratic Platform,” for example, put forward a demand to organize its structures at all levels, stop paying membership fees to the CPSU, and divide the party’s property.
The CPSU began to be removed from economic policy. There was an instruction not to interfere in the elections of people's deputies of the USSR, and to reduce personnel issues to a minimum. If earlier there were about 15 thousand positions under the control of the Central Committee, then after the 28th Congress there were approximately 2 thousand. Thus, the party was deprived of the most powerful lever of politics - the selection of the main leadership cadres of the country. The party's statutory body, the Secretariat of the CPSU Central Committee, where the healthy forces of the Central Committee began to concentrate, ceased to function, and the composition of the Politburo completely changed. The author of these lines was already a year and a half before the liquidation of the USSR, neither in the Central Committee, nor in the Politburo, nor in the Supreme Soviet of the USSR. A massive outflow of people from the party began. In 1990, 1.8 million people left the party, and a fifth of the workshop party organizations ceased work.
There was literally a persecution, a hunt for communists who were actively advocating perestroika on a socialist basis, against democrats and political careerists. Procurator workers Gdlyan and Ivanov sowed suspicions of bribery among members of the Politburo, including in relation to E.K. Ligachev. I had to send a letter to the USSR Prosecutor's Office, the Congress of People's Deputies of the USSR, the Supreme Soviet of the USSR, and the CPSU Central Committee with a request to consider the accusations against me and publish the results of the investigation in the press. All of the above-mentioned bodies carried out an inspection and discussion in the most thorough manner, openly and publicly. They recognized that this was a “malicious invention”, and those who carried out Yeltsin’s order were fired.

The question is whether organized resistance was offered to hostile forces. Unfortunately, the resistance was belated...

What lessons should be learned from the temporary defeat of socialism in our country??
The main lesson is to protect the cohesion and unity of the party ranks, not to lose vigilance, to ideologically and organizationally strengthen the Communist Party of the Russian Federation, the Union of Communist Parties, as well as the communist parties that are part of it. When developing internal party democracy, under no circumstances should we allow political careerism, any factions, or platforms in the communist parties. The enemy is counting on traitors within the party.

Modernization is improvement, improvement. Modernization capitalist society- the programmatic requirement of social democracy, the main thing for which is the desire to preserve and “improve” capitalism, ridding it of extreme abominations, without changing the fundamentals. Socialist modernization - changes, improvement of society in the process of building socialism, like the NEP, GOERLO, five-year plans for industrialization, collectivization, and the cultural revolution.
Modernization, announced by the President of Russia, means the preservation and strengthening of capitalism, that is, moving backwards, backwards. G.A. Zyuganov’s statement “The name of modernization is socialism” fully corresponds to V.I. Lenin’s testament that “you cannot move forward without going towards socialism.”